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LOYALTY, PATERNALISM, AND RIGHTS:
CLIENT COUNSELING THEORY AND THE
ROLE OF CHILD'S COUNSEL IN
DELINQUENCY CASES
Kristin Henning*
"[My first task is] to get these kids help. If they don't agree with me,
I don't care. I know what is in their best-interest better than their
parents do."1 Quote of child's defense counsel in Texas. October
2000.
"Sometimes we sell 'em down the river. I get confused as to
whether to be an advocate or act in the best-interest of the child."
2
Quote of child's defense counsel in Maine. October 2003.
"I have a Public Defender, but it isn't quite the same as having a
lawyer. He works with the judge, not like a real lawyer. If he were
real, then he would not follow along with the judge." 3 Quote of
juvenile defendant in Washington. October 2003.
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I TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEF. PROJECT ON INDIGENT DEF. PRACTICES IN TEX.-JuvE-
NILE CHAPTER, SELLINGJUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 24 (2000)
[hereinafter TEXAS ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.texasappleseed.net/inprint/
pdf/sellshort.pdf.
2 ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & NEW ENGLAND JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MAINE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELIN-
QUENCY PROCEEDINGS 28 (2003) [hereinafter MAINE ASSESSMENT], available at http://
www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles-publications/publications/juvenile-indi-
gent-defense_20031001/mereport.pdf.
3 ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., WASHINGTON: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE OFFENDER MA=rRs 32 (2003)
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"The purpose of [the disposition] stage is for all parties to assist in
developing a dispositional plan. The minor's attorney at this stage
must consider and recommend what is in the minor's best-interests,
even if it is contrary to the minor's wishes." 4 Quote ofjudge in Illi-
nois. 1995.
In the 1967 landmark case In re Gault,5 the Supreme Court ruled
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees an accused child the right to counsel in delinquency cases. 6 In
1979 and 1980, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion (OJJDP) and the American Bar Association (ABA), respectively,
published Juvenile Justice Standards that instructed child's counsel to
provide zealous advocacy as directed by the client at all stages of the
delinquency proceedings. 7 Since then, numerous scholars and lead-
ers in the juvenile justice community have endorsed a traditional, cli-
ent-directed model of advocacy in delinquency cases.8 Yet, despite the
weight of scholarly opinion, the role of the zealous, expressed-interest
advocate is far from uniform in juvenile practice. As evident from the
anecdotal evidence at the start of this article, best-interest advocacy
persists in the practice of many juvenile courts across the country. In
stark contrast to the expressed-interest model, an attorney advocating
in the best-interest of the child may discount or altogether ignore the
wishes of the child client and instead make decisions that he or she
[hereinafter WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/
justice/articles-publications/publications/juvenile-indigent defense 20031001 /
wareport.pdf.
4 In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908, 918 (Ill. 1995).
5 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6 Id. at 41.
7 STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES 3.1(a), 9.4(a) (IJA-ABA
Joint Comm'n on juvenile Justice Standards 1979). In 1971, the Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards Project was initiated at the Institute of Judicial Administration. The standards
were first published as a tentative draft in 1975 and 1976, and final revised drafts were
published in 1980. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
(1979).
8 See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, The Right To Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflec-
tions on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984); Ellen Marrus, Best-
Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation for Chil-
dren Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REv. 288 (2003); Wallace J. Mylniec, Who Decides: Deci-
sion Making in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 105, 109 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995); Lisa A. Stanger,
Note, Conflicts Between Attorneys and Social Workers Representing Children in Delinquency
Proceedings, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1123 (1996).
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believes to be most appropriate for the care or rehabilitation of the
child. 9
The long adherence to best-interest advocacy may be attributed
to any number of systemic or normative variables including significant
limitations in the language and holding of In re Gault, the inadequacy
of state statutes implementing the juvenile's right to counsel; the
deeply entrenched history of paternalism in the juvenile justice sys-
tem; and normative objections to ceding autonomy to children. Even
absent normative objections to client-directed advocacy, the most zeal-
ous advocate will often find it difficult and sometimes impossible to
engage in traditional client-directed advocacy with children and ado-
lescents. Cognitive limitations in the youth's decisionmaking capacity
along with the youth's frequent lack of trust for adults, limited ability
to recall and recount information, and poor and changing value sys-
tems may all frustrate the traditional attorney-client paradigm.
Unfortunately the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have
been only marginally useful in providing guidance to attorneys who
represent clients of diminished cognitive capacity. Even the Rules'
nominal commitment to some "normal" or "traditional" attorney-cli-
ent relationship for minors,10 by itself, does not provide counsel with a
particularly vivid picture of how the attorney-client relationship
should look in any given context. Within the rubric of "traditional,"
expressed-interest advocacy, there appears to be a wide range of ethi-
cally acceptable attorney-client paradigms. Viable paradigms might
differ in how much direction the client will provide to his or her attor-
ney and vice versa; how specific decision points will be allocated be-
tween the attorney and the client; and how much nonlegal, moral
counseling may be offered by the attorney. When the clients are chil-
dren or adolescents, the paradigms might also differ in how much
influence parents may have in the attorney-child relationship. Given
the breadth and complexity of factors that must be considered in se-
lecting an appropriate attorney-client framework in a delinquency
9 Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers'Roles, 64 FoRD AM L. REv,. 1699, 1701-02 (1996) (stating that the best-interest
model involves substitution of the lawyer's judgment for the child client's judgment);
Elizabeth Laffitte, Model Rule 1.14: The Well-Intended Rule Still Leaves Some Questions
Unanswered, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 327 (2004) (stating that the best-interest
model can result in "moral dilemma of wanting to enforce what the lawyer feels is in
the best-interest of the client, even if it is opposed to the client's wishes").
10 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2003) ("When a client's capacity
to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is di-
minished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason,
the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relation-
ship with the client.").
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case, it is clear that we can no longer examine the attorney-client dyad
through the binary lens of best-interest versus traditional, expressed-
interest advocacy.
This Article seeks to identify an attorney-child framework that will
(1) give substantive meaning to the child's constitutional right to
counsel in delinquency cases, (2) satisfy the ethical mandates of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, (3) have the flexibility to ac-
commodate cognitive limitations while enhancing the decisionmaking
capacity of children and adolescents, and (4) engage parents in vari-
ous aspects of the delinquency case without compromising the sanc-
tity of the attorney-client relationship or sacrificing the fundamental
rights, dignity, and autonomy of the child client.
In Part I of this Article, I will look briefly at the history of the
right to counsel in delinquency cases, paying particular attention to
the development of a professional consensus regarding the role of
counsel in these proceedings. I will also examine the normative, sys-
temic and practical barriers that prevent the professional consensus
from reaching the masses of practitioners in juvenile courts.
In Parts II and III, I push away from the binary best-interest/ex-
pressed-interest analysis to explore the expanding range of attorney-
client models that might be appropriate in a delinquency case. Part II
will first consider the various best-interest and substituted judgment
models of advocacy that seem to have evolved in direct response to
concerns about the child's limited cognitive ability and poor value
judgment. Specifically, Part II will examine ways in which attorneys,
parents, and guardians in these models may usurp power over the at-
torney-client relationship, and ultimately concludes that none of the
best-interest or surrogate decision models adequately safeguard the
child's right to counsel or comport with the attorney's ethical obliga-
tions in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Part III will then consider the continuum of "traditional" ex-
pressed-interest models of advocacy that appear hyper attorney-domi-
nated on one end of the spectrum and hyper client-dominated on the
other. Ultimately I am less concerned about the nomenclature identi-
fying the various models, but instead attempt to identify features
within each model that might best accommodate the competing, but
not always incompatible,juvenile justice goals of client autonomy, fun-
damental fairness, and the rehabilitation of youth with often dimin-
ished cognitive and psychosocial capacities.
This Article concludes by urging scholars, commentators, and
practitioners to abandon outdated stereotypes and presumptions
about the cognitive capacity of children, and endorses a collaborative
model of advocacy in which attorneys may educate children and ado-
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lescents on the short- and long-term consequences of all potential
case-related decisions; patiently lead youth through the pros and cons
of each option; and enhance the youth's ever evolving decisionmak-
ing skills and capacity. This Article recognizes that through collabora-
tion, the lawyer may improve the child's rehabilitative prospects by
earning acceptance and cooperation from the child and by engaging
parents and other relevant persons in the decisionmaking process
without undue deference to those adults. With a collaborative model
as the default framework, best-interest and expressed-interest advo-
cates should find a place of compromise and bring greater uniformity
to the representation of accused children.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF CHILD'S COUNSEL IN
DELINQUENCY CASES
A. Gault's Ambiguities and Early Debate over the Role of Counsel
Before the nineteenth century, common law did not differentiate
between adults and children charged with crime."1 In the mid to late
nineteenth century, reformers began to see children differently and
came to believe that children could be steered away from crime
through rehabilitation in lieu of punishment and retribution. 12 In
1899, Illinois reformers created the first independent juvenile court
rooted in this new rehabilitative, paternalistic philosophy. 13 By 1914,
juvenile courts had spread all over the country. 14 Prior to the Court's
ruling in In re Gault, reformers deemed assistance of counsel unneces-
sary for the child since juvenile courts were not designed to punish
11 DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING
AND THE LAw 8-10 (1992) (explaining that in England and the United States, beyond
the age of seven the law did not distinguish with regard to age or gender in assigning
punishment, and adult and child offenders were housed in common quarters); Julian
W. Mack, The Chancery Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND
THE COURT 310, 310 (1925); see also RichardJ. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative
Competence and Youthful Offenders (noting that although there were no categorical rules
separating children from adults regarding culpability, sometimes judges did consider
infancy in proceedings and sometimes juveniles were kept separate in prisons), in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 73, 80 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
12 Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings:
A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401, 1402 (1973).
13 David Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century:
Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 43
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
14 HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1927).
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the offender. 15 Yet despite the purportedly benign intent of judges
and other juvenile court officials, it became clear by the early 1960s
that procedural regularities and even fundamental fairness were being
sacrificed in favor of some nominal commitment to rehabilitation. In
re Gault and its progeny thus sought to import fairness into juvenile
proceedings by identifying a series of fundamental rights that must be
guaranteed to children in a delinquency case. 16 The right to counsel
was one of the most important rights conferred during this due pro-
cess era of juvenile court history.
Although Gault clearly guaranteed children the right to counsel
in delinquency cases, ambiguities in the language of the case led to
confusion about the roles, responsibilities, and loyalties the child's
lawyer would assume. In the decade after Gault, there was a flurry of
scholarly commentary regarding the role of counsel at the various
stages of the delinquency case. 17 Confusion seemed to emerge in
three primary areas. First, commentators questioned whether the role
of counsel in the adjudicatory (trial) phase of the delinquency case
should mirror the supposed adversary role of counsel in adult crimi-
nal cases or instead conform to the paternalistic, best-interest-of-the-
child philosophy of juvenile court.18 Much of the early confusion
arose out of the Court's desire to ensure necessary procedural safe-
guards without simultaneously stripping the juvenile justice system of
its more benign elements.19 The Court specifically declared that "con-
stitutional domestication" was not meant to undo the rehabilitative
15 See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 82-83; Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at
1403.
16 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (stating that the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits the prosecution of a juvenile in adult court where juvenile had al-
ready been adjudicated in juvenile court); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970)
(stating that the Constitution requires that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt in delinquency proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-36 (1967) (stating that
the Constitution guarantees adequate notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege
against self-incrimination, and rights of confrontation and cross-examination).
17 Elyce Z. Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1971); Kay & Segal, supra note 12; Monrad G. Paulsen, Juvenile
Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527 (1968); Anthony Platt et al., In Defense of
Youth: A Case Study of the Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968); Daniel
L. Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 43 IND.
L.J. 558 (1968).
18 Ferster et al., supra note 17, at 384-85; Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1401.
19 Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (discussing the Court's belief that "observance of due
process standards" does not require states to abandon the "substantive benefits" of
processing juveniles separately from adults); see also Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at
1409 (arguing that the Gault ambiguity was further confused by the Supreme Court's
subsequent ruling in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548-49 (1971), which
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focus of the juvenile courts. 20 While the Court, on the one hand, saw
no meaningful or substantive difference between adult criminal trials
and juvenile adjudicatory hearings,2 1 the Court, in a footnote, went on
to declare that "[r] ecognition of the right to counsel involves no nec-
essary interference with the special purposes of juvenile court proce-
dures; indeed it seems that counsel can play an important role in the
process of rehabilitation." 22 While some commentators argued that
counsel's obligations to his client should be the same in adult and
juvenile matters, 23 others argued that best-interest advocacy was justi-
fied by the inherent difference between the rehabilitative goals of ju-
venile court and the deterrent-retributive focus of criminal courts.
2 4
Other supporters of paternalistic advocacy questioned whether the
child was even capable of determining his or her own interests and
directing counsel. 25
In a second area of confusion, early commentators questioned
whether the role of counsel at the disposition (sentencing) phase of a
delinquency case should differ from the role of counsel at the adjudi-
catory phase. In Gault, the Court explicitly limited its holding to adju-
dicatory hearings and chose not to rule on whether due process
requirements must be observed at hearings to determine the disposi-
tion of the delinquent child. 26 In yet another footnote, the Court
stated that "[t] he problems of pre-adjudication treatment ofjuveniles,
and of post-adjudication disposition, are unique to the juvenile pro-
cess; hence what we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural
requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability
reaffirmed the state's right to deal with juveniles differently from the way it treated
adults).
20 Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
21 Id. at 35-36 (rejecting idea that probation officer or judge can adequately pro-
tect the interests of a child and noting that "[a ] proceeding where the issue is whether
the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for
years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution").
22 Id. at 38 n.64.
23 Ferster et al., supra note 17, at 384-85; Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1404.
24 Jacob L. Issacs, Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court,
12 Burr. L. REv. 501, 507 (1962); Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1403; Anthony Platt &
Ruth Friedman, Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 1156, 1179 (1968); see alsoJanet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a
Family-Focused juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REv. 1153, 1161 (2001);
Katherine R. Kruse, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: Lawyers
Should Be Lawyers, but What Does That Mean?: A Response to Aiken & Wizner and Smith, 14
WASH. U. J.L. & PoLY 49, 80 (2004) (providing a historical discussion).
25 Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1402, 1411.
26 387 U.S. at 13, 27.
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to other steps of the juvenile process." 27 Although the Court explicitly
acknowledged that a child needs the assistance of counsel in "every
step in the delinquency proceeding against him,"28 the footnoted lan-
guage and the decision not to extend the holding beyond the adjudi-
catory phase left open the possibility that a child might not even have
a right to counsel at the disposition stage.29 Even if not constitution-
ally guaranteed,30 the vast majority of the fifty states now guarantee an
accused child a statutory right to counsel at the disposition stage. 1
27 Id. at 31 n.48.
28 Id. at 36.
29 Ironically, the Court then went on to discuss the New York Family Court Act as
a model of the trend to appoint counsel. The selected excerpt from the New York Act
explicitly states that "counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due
process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and
proper orders of disposition." Id. at 40.
30 Post-Gault rulings in the adult criminal context may provide greater support
for a constitutional argument for the child's right to counsel in the disposition phase
of a juvenile case. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972), and a series of cases that followed, held that the right to counsel cannot be
governed by the classification of the offense or by whether or not a jury trial is re-
quired and that no person may be deprived of his liberty without counsel unless and
until that right is knowingly and intelligently waived. Debate in the juvenile context
would likely focus on whether placement in a rehabilitative facility is sufficiently akin
to "imprisonment" as to constitute a loss of liberty warranting due process protection.
31 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-63(a) (LexisNexis 1995) ("all stages"); AIAsKA STAT.
§ 47.12.040 (2004) ("all stages"); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (Supp. 2004) ("in all
proceedings involving offenses"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316 (Supp. 2003) ("all
stages"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-135 (West 2004) (at the commencement of any
proceeding concerning the alleged delinquency of a child); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2304 (LexisNexis 2005) ("at all critical stages ... including the time of admission or
denial of allegations . . . and all subsequent stages"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.203(1)
(West Supp. 2005) ("all stages"); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6(b) (2005) ("all stages");
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5 (West Supp. 2005) ("all stages"); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.11 (West 2000) (right to counsel guaranteed at the time of custody, during
detention, at the waiver hearing, at the adjudicatory hearing, at the disposition hear-
ing, and at "hearings to review and modify a dispositional order"); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1606 (2000) ("every stage"); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 809 (2004) ("every
stage"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3306 (2003) ("every stage"); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-20 (LexisNexis 2003) ("every stage"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
119, § 29 (LexisNexis 2004) ("at all hearings"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712a.17c
(West 2004) ("at each stage of the proceedings"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201 (West
2004) ("all stages"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.211 (West 2004) ("all proceedings");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1413 (2003) ("all stages"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272 (2003)
("all proceedings"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62D.030 (LexisNexis 2004) ("all stages");
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39 (West 1987) ("at every critical stage in the proceeding
which, in the opinion of the court may result in the institutional commitment of the
juvenile"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) ("all stages"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-2000 (2003) ("all proceedings"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.352
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These statutes, however, do not address whether the role of counsel
might differ at the various stages of the delinquency proceeding.
While some early commentators argued that the adversary posi-
tion was necessary at every stage of the case to protect the child's con-
stitutional rights,3 2 others supported an adversary role only at the
adjudicatory phase and endorsed a best-interest model at other more
rehabilitative phases such as disposition. 33 In an even more nuanced
analysis, some commentators argued that the attorney's role should
vary according to the adequacy of services and treatment being of-
fered by the juvenile court. 34 That is, in cases or jurisdictions where
rehabilitative services were clearly inadequate or even harmful to the
child, the attorney should assume the role of zealous adversary fight-
ing against the child's placement in the facilities. In jurisdictions
where services were adequate and appropriate, the child's counsel
should act as a member of the juvenile court team.
In a third area of confusion, commentators questioned the role
parents should play in directing the child's counsel.3 5 This additional
concern arose out of the Court's discussion in Gault of the "parent's
right to custody" of their child and suggestion that parents may have a
due process interest in delinquency proceedings precisely because
that right is in jeopardy. 36 Seemingly to protect the rights of parents,
the Court concluded that notions of fundamental fairness and due
process guarantee the child and his parents the right to notice of spe-
cific charges and allegations, notice of the child's right to be repre-
sented by counsel, and notice that counsel will be appointed for the
(LexisNexis Supp. 2004) ("all stages"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6337 (West Supp.
2005) ("all stages"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126 (2001) ("all stages"); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 51.10 (Vernon 2004) ("every stage"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-913 (Supp.
2005) ("every stage"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140 (West 2004) ("all critical
stages"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-9 (LexisNexis 2003) ("all stages"); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 938.23 (West Supp. 2003) ("all stages"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-222 (2004) ("every
stage"); A.A. v. State, 538 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Alaska 1975) (all stages); State ex rel.
D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 412 (W. Va. 1980) ("dispositional stage"). Only a
few of the fight to counsel statutes make any effort to clarify the role counsel should
assume at disposition or any other phase of the delinquency case. See infra Part I.C.2
for additional discussion of statutory and common law interpretations of the fight to
counsel in delinquency cases.
32 Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1418 (citing Jacob L. Isaacs, The Lawyer in the
Juvenile Court, 10 CRIM. L.Q. 222, 235 (1968)).
33 Ferster et al., supra note 17, at 384-85; Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1404.
34 Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1414-15, 1420.
35 Id. at 1420-23; see also Ferster et al., supra note 17, at 382 (discussing potential
conflicts between parents and child).
36 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34 (1967).
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child if the child or his parents cannot afford one.3 7 Since Gault,
some states have even recognized the parent as a formal party to delin-
quency proceedings and have awarded parents an independent statu-
tory right to counsel. 38 Interestingly, in one of their early appeals to
the trial court's action, Gault's parents asserted that it was error for
the juvenile court to remove their son from their custody without first
finding them unsuitable.3 9 The parents did not re-raise this issue on
appeal to the Supreme Court and the Court expressly declined to ad-
dress it and other issues that were not directly before it.40 Thus, the
Court did not hold in Gault and has never since held that parents
must be found unfit before a child may be removed from the home in
a delinquency proceeding. Nonetheless, the language in Gault led
some early commentators to reason that even when the child is ap-
pointed counsel, the parent retains significant authority over the case
and the direction of the child's counsel.41
In their book, Before the Best Interests of the Child, Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit read Gault's "right to custody" lan-
guage as a ringing endorsement of the parents' right to make deci-
sions about what their children need.42 As they put it,
[t] here is no hint in Gault, and it would run contrary to its tenor,
that an attorney could independently represent the child over the
parents' objection and prior to their disqualification as the exclu-
sive representatives of his interests. Protection of the family, protec-
tion of the child from the state-not from his parents-is central to
the holding in Gault. .... 43
Other early commentators recognized the potential for conflicts
between the child and the parent and were not so quick to read the
37 Id. at 41.
38 See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6
(2005) ("[A] party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of any
proceedings alleging delinquency.... If the interests of two or more parties conflict,
separate counsel shall be provided for each of them."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-514
(2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (LexisNexis 2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.211
(West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62D.100 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 24 (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-110 (Supp. 2004); Sanchez v.
Walker County Dep't of Family and Children Servs., 299 S.E.2d 66, 69-70 (Ga. 1976)
(recognizing that parent is a party to proceedings involving his child under Georgia
statute, now codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6).
39 Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
40 Id. at 10-11.
41 SeeJOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 128-29
(1979); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
42 GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 128.
43 Id. at 129.
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right to counsel as a right of the parent over the child. 44 These com-
mentators recognized that conflicts are particularly common in cases
where a parent is the party instituting the proceedings against a child
or where, in the course of defending a child, defense counsel will have
to use information that might lead to criminal or civil charges against
the parent for neglect or contributing to the delinquency of a
minor.4 5
Ultimately, the confusion generated by the conflicting agenda of
the Court in Gault left juvenile judges, child advocates, and legal
scholars in debate over the role of defense counsel. The tug of war
between discretionary paternalism and the adversary due process
model in the pre- Gault era was certainly not relieved, and was proba-
bly even exacerbated by the language in Gault.46
B. Consensus Among Legal Scholars and Professional Leaders
Notwithstanding the initial debate, by the early 1980s a consensus
seems to have evolved among academic commentators and profes-
sional leaders in the juvenile justice community regarding the appro-
priate role of counsel in delinquency cases. The professional
leadership as represented by the OJJDP, the ABA, and the Institute of
Judicial Administration (IJA) issued a series of standards to govern the
administration of justice for children charged with crimes. 47 These
standards uniformly endorsed an expressed-interest, adversarial
model of representation for children at all phases of the delinquency
case.
The standards issued by the IJA and the ABA (IJA-ABA Stan-
dards) discuss the function of the child's counsel as follows:
However engaged, the lawyer's principal duty is the representation
of the client's legitimate interests. 48
In general, determination of the client's interests in the proceed-
ings, and hence the plea to be entered, is ultimately the responsibil-
ity of the client after full consultation with the attorney.49
Ordinarily, the lawyer should not make or agree to a specific dispo-
sitional recommendation without the client's consent.50 ... It is the
44 Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1420-23.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1409.
47 STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES 3.1 (a) (IJA-ABA Joint
Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Standards 1979).
48 Id.
49 Id. 3.1 (b)(i).
50 Id. 9.3(a).
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lawyer's duty to insist that proper procedure be followed through-
out the disposition stage and that orders entered be based on ade-
quate reliable evidence. 5
1
By the mid-1980s, a similar view was uniformly endorsed in the
legal academy. Professor Martin Guggenheim's 1984 article on the
legal representation of children marks a significant benchmark in
commentary on this issue.5 2 Guggenheim identifies the client's right
to control his attorney as the principal means by which the client may
exercise or waive substantive rights accorded to him.5 3 He further ar-
gues that the role of counsel must vary according to the age of the
child and the nature of the rights at stake in the proceeding. 54 Thus,
in delinquency cases where children tend to be older and fundamen-
tal rights like those conferred in Gault are substantial, Guggenheim
argues that client-directed advocacy is essential. 55
Today, even where disagreement persists among scholars over the
role of counsel in abuse and neglect and other child-related proceed-
ings,5 6 the weight of academic opinion now firmly supports the tradi-
tional expressed-interest, adversary model of advocacy in delinquency
cases. 57 In 1996, a group of child advocates and scholars convened a
51 Id. 9.4(a).
52 Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 86. Guggenheim's article must be considered a
seminal work as it is cited widely not only by other scholars, but also by state and local
ethics committees, appellate courts, and practitioners' writing practice manuals.
53 Id. at 80-81.
54 Id. at 86-88, 92-93.
55 Id. at 86-88.
56 For a representative sampling see JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN
CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS § 3-2(b) (1), at
51 (1997); Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child
Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 895, 900-01 (1999); Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representa-
tion for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles Are Required, 34 FAM.
L.Q. 441 (2000); David R. Katner, Coming To Praise, Not To Bury, the New ABA Standards
of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 103 (2000); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best-Interests in Client-
Directed Lauyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1505,
1507 (1996). See also Del. Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Informal Op. 2001-1 (2001) (en-
dorsing the best-interest advocacy in child protective cases despite criticism by Peters
and others).
57 For a representative sampling, see Janet Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv.
1083, 1129-30 (1991); Marrus, supra note 8, at 334; Mlyniec, supra note 8, at 109;
Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness of Participation as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juve-
nile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 175, 176 (2003); Robert E. Shepard &
Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child Is My Client, but Who Am 1?, " 64 FoRDHAM L. REv.
1917, 1942 (1996); Stanger, supra note 8, at 1125 (manifesting cursory acceptance of
zealous advocate model of advocacy).
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symposium at Fordham Law School to discuss various aspects of the
legal representation of children. 58 Symposium scholars developed a
series of recommendations and expressly rejected the best-interest or
guardian ad litem model of representation for children in every case
in which such a model was not statutorily mandated by the relevant
jurisdiction. 59 Much of the more recent commentary draws not only
from Guggenheim's rights-based analysis, but also from the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct which call upon attorneys to maintain a
"normal" relationship with their clients as far as reasonably possible
even when a client's decisionmaking capacity is diminished. 60
Yet, despite any evidence of an academic consensus, it is clear
that the expressed-interest, zealous advocate model is far from uni-
form in practice throughout the country.6 1 The ABA, in partnership
with other nonprofit juvenile justice agencies, has conducted a series
of state assessments on the representation of indigent juveniles in de-
linquency cases. 62 In each state, expert consultants have evaluated the
58 Bruce A. Green & Bernadine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of
Law, 64 FoRD-tAm L. REv. 1281, 1283-84 (1996).
59 Id. at 1294; Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Represen-
tation of Children, 64 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1301, 1302 (1996).
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2003); see, e.g., Samuel M. Davis,
The Role of the Attorney in Child Advocacy, 32 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 817 (1994);James
D. Gallagher & Cara M. Kearney, Representing a Client with Diminished Capacity: Where
the Law Stands and Where It Needs To Go, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597 (2003); Laffitte,
supra note 9.
61 Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers
in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1655, 1678-79
(1996) ("Attorneys have continued to identify with a nonadversarial role because of
hostility from juvenile court judges and a general belief in the appropriateness of
serving the child's best-interests."); see also infra notes 66-69.
62 For a discussion of the assessment methodology, see Susanne M. Bookser,
Note, Making Gault Meaningful: Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delin-
quency Proceedings for Indigent Youth, 3 WHITTIERrJ. CHILD &c FAM. AD-VOC. 297 (2004).
Thus far, twelve state assessments have been published: ABAJUvENILEJUSTICE CTR. &
S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2001) [hereinafter GEOR-
GIA ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf; ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE CTR. NAT'LJuv. DEFENDER CTR. ET AL., KENTUCKY: ADVANCING JUSTICE: AN As-
SESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS (2002) [hereinafter KENTUCKY ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.
njdc.info/pdf/kentucky-assessment.pdf; ABA CR., THE CHILDREN LErr BEHIND: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA (2001) [hereinafter LOUISIANA ASSESSMENT], available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/LAreport.pdf; MAINE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2; ABAJuvE-
NILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
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quality of and access to representation by observing court proceed-
ings, gathering statistical data and interviewing children, parents,
judges, probation officers and other local juvenile justice stakehold-
ers.6 3 The reports from these assessments provide considerable evi-
dence of a persistent culture of paternalism in the legal
representation of children in the juvenile justice system.64 Some as-
(2003) [hereinafter MARYLAND ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.soros.org/initia-
tives/justice/articles-publications/publications/juvenile-indigent-defense_2003
1001/mdreport.pdf; ABAJUVENILEJUSTICE CTR., MONTANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS
TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003)
[hereinafter MONTANA ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/us-
tice/articles publications/publications/juvenile-indigent defense_20031001 /mtre-
port.pdf; ABAJUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NORTH CAROLINA:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QuALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELIN-
QUENCY PROCEEDINGS (Lynn Grindall ed., 2003) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA ASSESS-
MENT], available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articlespublications/
publications/juvenile-indigentdefense_20031001/ncreport.pdf; ABA JUVENILE JUS-
TICE CTR. & CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN
OHIO (Kim Brooks & Darlene Kamine eds., 2003) [hereinafter OHIO ASSESSMENT],
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio-Assessment.pdf; ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
CTR. & S. MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., PENNSYLVANIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS
TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003)
[hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/
justice/articlespublications/publications/juvenile-indigent defense_20031001/
pareport.pdf; TExAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 1; ABAJUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL.
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUAL-
ITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2002) [hereinafter VIRGINIA As-
SESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Virginia%20Assessment.pdf;
WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, supra note 3.
63 Bookser, supra note 62, at 299.
64 See, e.g., GEORGIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 30 ("The prevailing philosophy
among many people who were interviewed is that delinquency proceedings should be
informed by the 'best-interest of the child."'); KENTUCKY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at
32 (finding an "overriding concern by everyone interviewed that their goal was to
serve the best-interest of the children involved in the court system . . . and that the
defense attorneys should be part of the 'team"'); MAINE ASSESSMENT, Supra note 2, at
28 (noting confusion among juvenile defenders and other juvenile court officers as to
whether defenders should be zealous advocates or whether they should be acting in
"'the best-interest of the child"'); MARYLAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 32 (noting
that "many public defenders did not appear to understand the critical role of defense
counsel in providing zealous advocacy through an express interest model of represen-
tation"); MONTANA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 40 ("Interviews with youth around
the state revealed that defenders were often working for the 'best-interests of the
child' and not advocating for the youth."); NORTH CAROLINA ASSESSMENT, supra note
62, at 39 (noting that defenders were "observed taking a 'best-interests' approach" by
advocating for detention for their clients on the belief that it would be best for those
children); OHIO ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 26 ('just over 40% of attorneys re-
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sessments show that defenders experience considerable internal con-
flict about what role they should play in the system. 65 Other
assessments show that defenders confronted with negative attitudes of
judges, prosecutors, and other juvenile court officers, feel compelled
to conform to the best-interest model in order to function within the
system.66 Now almost forty years after Gault, twenty-five years after the
IJA-ABA Standards, twenty years after Guggenheim's article, and ten
years after the Fordham conference, best-interest advocacy remains
standard practice in many juvenile courts.
C. Reaching the Masses: Understanding the Disparity Between Local
Practice and the Academic and Professional Leadership
A variety of normative, systemic, and political factors appear to
account for the persistence of best-interest advocacy in the face of a
clear academic and professional consensus to the contrary. The pater-
nalism that was the hallmark of the first juvenile court has impacted
every aspect of the modern juvenile justice system. Post-Gault right-to-
counsel statutes and modern rules of professional conduct have done
little to abate the influence of paternalism on the role of defense
counsel in juvenile proceedings. Moreover, even when counsel has lit-
tle normative opposition to zealous, expressed-interest advocacy, real
cognitive and psychosocial limitations among children and adoles-
cents continue to frustrate the relationship between the attorney and
his child client.
sponding to the surveys viewed their role as representing the 'best-interest' of the
youth rather than as the youth's advocate."); TEXAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 21
(noting that some stakeholders in the juvenile justice system believe that "the attor-
ney's primary function is to argue what is in the child's best-interest, regardless of
what the child wants"); VIRGINIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 31 ("Many profession-
als in juvenile court charged with working in the best-interest of the child believe that
defense counsel's role is similar to their own."); WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, supra note
3, at 24 ("It is also not uncommon for defenders to find themselves representing a
child client who has no other caring adult in his or her life. It's easy to slip into the
role of parent, even in a system that has rejected parens patriae as its guiding
principle.").
65 MAINE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 28 (noting "confusiion]" of public de-
fender as to his role as advocate or facilitator of a best-interest disposition); see also
David A. Harris, The Criminal Defense Lauyer in the Juvenile Justice System, 26 U. TOL. L.
REv. 751, 762 (1995); Shepard & England, supra note 57, at 1918 (noting that many
attorneys are confused as to the role they are supposed to take in delinquency
proceedings).
66 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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1. Deeply Entrenched History of Paternalism in the Juvenile
Justice System and Normative Objections to Ceding
Authority to Children
Since the inception of the juvenile court movement, the legacy of
paternalism has shaped and continues to shape the attitudes of mary
juvenile defenders who have a sincere desire to aid in the rehabilita-
tion of children.67 Because juvenile court is traditionally committed
to rehabilitation and not to punishment, many advocates believe that
children do not need the vigorous assistance of counsel and view best-
interest advocacy as an essential tool in the rehabilitative process.68 By
advocating for what they believe to be the best-interest of the child,
these attorneys-like other officials in the juvenile justice system-
hope to divert the child from a life of crime and protect him from the
consequences of his risky behavior. Attorneys face considerable diffi-
culties as they seek to fulfill their ethical obligation to safeguard the
child's procedural due process rights while fighting the paternalistic
desire to assist the court in the rehabilitation of children they
represent. 69
In many jurisdictions, even those defenders who wish to honor
their client's expressed-interests face tremendous systemic opposition
from judges, prosecutors, and probation officers who expect defense
counsel to participate as a part of the juvenile justice team.70 Judges
67 Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 1129-30; Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1404.
68 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967); Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 1129-30;
Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction ofJuvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54
FLA. L. REv. 577, 586 (2002); Shepard & England, supra note 57, at 1919; Charles E.
Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETIcs & PUB. POL'Y 397,
405 n.36 (1990); see, e.g., GEORGIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 31; NORTH CAROLINA
ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 39 (noting that some juvenile defenders, in taking a
"'best-interests' approach," believed that detention might serve as an appropriate
"'wake up call' for certain youth"); TEXAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 24; VIRGINIA
ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 31 (quoting a defense attorney as saying, "[w]e don't
need to be too adversarial because we get along well and work in the best-interest of
the kids"); WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 24 (quoting probation officer as
saying, "[t] he defense attorneys fight pretty hard for the kids, but when they know a
kid will get [access to addiction or mental health] treatment if he [doesn't get out of]
detention [right away] the [attorney] might not fight as hard to get the kid out. The
attorneys don't really [completely undermine a client's case and] cave on a client, but
they do act in the best-interests of their client at times") (alterations in original).
69 Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 1129-30; Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children:
How Do We Get There, 88J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 236 (1997); Harris, supra
note 65, at 762; Shepard & England, supra note 57, at 1918.
70 Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 1128-29; KENTUCKY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at
32 (noting that the "[o]verriding concern by everyone interviewed that their goal was
to serve the best-interest of the children involved in the court system.., and that the
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may even chastise attorneys for seeking to litigate legal issues or for
challenging the factual allegations on the merits. 71 As one judge in
Georgia stated in 2001, "'I expect my lawyers to act in the best-interest
of the child. If they can get the child off but it is not in that child's
best-interest, then they should not do it.' ",72 Some judges attempt to
avoid attorney interference by encouraging children and/or their par-
ents to waive counsel.73 Some judges simply ignore defense counsel
or insist that the attorneys be quiet.7 4 Professor David Harris, a for-
mer defender, described the courts' treatment and perspective on de-
fense counsel as a "hood ornament, a decorative accoutrement that
served no real function, but that was required by legal convention." 75
In more than one jurisdiction, assessment investigators reported that
"there was no perceived value in having an attorney represent the
youth" because the "attorneys would have no impact upon the
proceedings." 7 6
defense attorneys should be part of the 'team'"); MAINE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at
28 (noting that judges across the state expressed a clear belief that the first duty of
juvenile defenders is the child's best-interests and "zealous advocacy on legal grounds
is not favored"); MARYLAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 38 (noting that juvenile
defenders "who zealously advocate for their child clients are seen as interfering with
the 'best-interest' model"); MONTANA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 41 ("Zealous advo-
cacy seemed to be met with hostility and was negatively viewed as a means to get kids
'off.'"); TEXAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 21 (noting the "widespread belief that the
primary purpose of advocacy is 'to get the child services,' regardless of guilt or inno-
cence"); VIRGINIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 31 (reporting that many professionals
in juvenile court believe that the role of defense counsel is to protect the child's best-
interest); WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 31 (noting that in some jurisdic-
tions "defenders do not set trials, bring motions, or push for investigation funds be-
cause they fear 'rocking the boat' and being ostracized by the juvenile court
community").
71 Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 1128-29; Harris, supra note 65, at 758-63.
72 GEORGIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 31.
73 Berkheiser, supra note 68, at 581; Marrus, supra note 7, at 318-19; see also Ains-
worth, supra note 57, at 1127 (discussing evidence that judges may display conscious
or unconscious antagonism toward the idea of attorneys in juvenile court and take
their hostility out on the represented clients).
74 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 65, at 757 (narrative essay on personal experience).
75 Id. at 763.
76 OHIO ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 27; see also LOUISIANA ASSESSMENT, Supra
note 62, at 67 ("'[W] hat is missing is someone whose job it is to challenge the best-
interest perspective and to present to the court evidence of factual or actual inno-
cence.'") (quoting ajuvenile court observer); MARYLAND ASSESSMENT, supra note 62,
at 38 (noting that the "best-interest" culture that pervades the juvenile court often
serves to "relegate[ ] defense counsel to little more than a decorative ornament in a
process that often results in unfair outcomes").
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Like the judges, some prosecutors view defenders as "partners"
who share in a common goal of redirecting the child and deciding
what is in the child's best-interest. 77 Other prosecutors resent defense
attorneys who seek to vindicate their client's legal rights and interfere
with the child's potential rehabilitation. 78 Attorneys confronted with
these systemic barriers are bound to experience feelings of frustration
and futility in fulfilling their role as counsel for the child in delin-
quency cases. 79 Even the most well intentioned advocate finds that
living up to the goal of client-directed advocacy is virtually impossible
when the culture of the system is geared towards finding children de-
linquent in order to obtain services. Attorneys not only fear that they
will lose future case appointments if they do not buy into the paternal-
ism of the court,8 0 but many also fear that they will do the child more
harm than good by insisting on a zealous advocacy model that is so
resented in the system. 8'
Paternalistic advocacy persists in juvenile courts not only through
efforts to rehabilitate children, but also through broader normative
objections to the transfer of authority from adults to children. Oppo-
sition to adolescent decisionmaking autonomy is well documented in
laws that use age to grant or deny certain rights or privileges to young
people. For example, state statutes that require students to attend
school, that prevent children from suing or being sued on their own,
or that deny children the right to contract, marry, vote, drive, or
purchase alcohol, tobacco, or pornographic material may reflect a so-
cietal presumption that children by nature generally lack the capacity
to make decisions about these issues on their own. 82 On the other
hand, legislative and judicial determinations that allow these same
children to accept or refuse medical treatment, assert a constitutional
right to abortion, exercise other substantive rights of privacy and free
speech, and to waive constitutional rights such as the right to counsel
and the right against self-incrimination without the guidance of an
adult, apparently presume children competent to decide in these ar-
77 GEORGIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 30-31.
78 Id. at 30.
79 See, e.g., id. at 30; Harris, supra note 65, at 762-64.
80 Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 1129-30; NancyJ. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1843 (1996).
81 GEORGIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 29.
82 See Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-The Proper
Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 423,
424, 437-39 (1992); WallaceJ. Mlyniec, supra note 8, at 109; Moore, supra note 80, at
1828-29; Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv.
547, 547, 557-58 (2000).
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eas. 83 Considering the seemingly irrational inconsistencies between
many of these legislative and common law presumptions, the pre-
sumptions probably say less about a child's true decisionmaking ca-
pacity and more about societal norms that ultimately shape the rules
of decisional autonomy. Societal norms affecting the allocation of
decisionmaking authority between children and adults are necessarily
concerned with balancing competing interests such as respect for pa-
rental autonomy to raise children as they wish, the desire to ensure
that children have a healthy and productive future, the need to pro-
tect society from the consequences of immature and unwise decisions
of children, and the state's obligation to protect certain constitutional
rights of the child.8 4 In delinquency cases, best-interest advocacy may
be supported by social norms that suggest that important legal deci-
sions should be left to adults who are purportedly better equipped to
ensure both the safety of the community and the welfare of the child.
2. Inadequacy of State Statutes and Judicial Opinion
Implementing and Interpreting the Right to Counsel
Paternalistic judges and best-interest advocates also remain un-
swayed by right-to-counsel statutes that, at least nominally, attempt to
clarify the role of child's counsel. Possibly in some initial effort to
differentiate between the potential roles of appointed advocates, sev-
eral state legislatures adopted the contrasting language of "guardian
ad litem" and "counsel/attorney for the child" in right-to-counsel stat-
utes. Statutes in these states might require the court to appoint
"counsel" for the child in a delinquency or person in need of supervi-
sion proceeding, but require the court to appoint a "guardian ad li-
83 See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Chil-
dren, 64 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1399, 1422 (1996); Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 84;
Moore, supra note 80, at 1849.
84 See Hafen, supra note 82, at 456 (arguing that Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct should be interpreted in a subject matter by subject matter ap-
proach); Scott, supra note 82, at 557-58 (providing detailed analysis of allocation of
children's rights based on a myriad of socio-political factors). The influence of polit-
ics and norms in the regulation of children's decisional autonomy is probably most
starkly evident in the seemingly irrational contrast of the legislative presumption of
decisional competence of sixteen and seventeen year-olds in criminal death penalty
cases and the legislative presumption in some states of decisional incompetence of
these same youth to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. See Berkheiser, supra
note 68, at 625. The Supreme Court has also chosen to allocate children's rights on a
case-by-case approach and has recognized the diversity of circumstances in which chil-
dren are involved. Compare Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking down pa-
rental consent for abortion), with Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-43 (1968)
(upholding ban on sale of sex-related materials to minors).
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tem" in a neglect or dependency proceeding.8 5 In other states,
statutes might permit the court to appoint both a "guardian ad litem"
and an "attorney for the child" in a delinquency case. 86 The contrast-
85 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (Supp. 2004) (right to counsel in juvenile
proceedings and appointment of a guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect proceed-
ings); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304 (LexisNexis 2001) (appointment of counsel in delin-
quency proceedings and guardian ad litem in neglect proceedings). Compare ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(a)(1) (2003), with id. § 9-27-316(0(1); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 985.203 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005) (right to counsel in delinquency cases), with id. §
39.822 (West 2003) (appointment of guardian ad litem in abuse, abandonment, and
neglect proceedings); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5 (West 1999) (right to coun-
sel in delinquency cases), with id. 405/2-17 (West 2000) (appointment of guardian ad
litem in abuse and neglect cases); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 2000) (right to
counsel in delinquency cases), with id. § 232.89 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (appoint-
ment of guardian ad litem in child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 610.290 (West 2005) (right to counsel in delinquency cases), with id. § 620.100
(West 2005 & Supp. 2005) (appointment of "court-appointed special advocate volun-
teer" in dependency, neglect, and abuse cases); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 3-8A-20 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2004) (right to counsel in delinquency cases),
with id. § 3-813 (LexisNexis 2002) (appointment of a "Court-Appointed Special Advo-
cate" in child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:12
(LexisNexis 2001) (right to counsel in delinquency cases), with id. § 169-C:10, invali-
dated in part by In re Shelby R., 804 A.2d 435 (N.H. 2002) (declaring unconstitutional
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:10(II) (a)) (appointment of guardian ad litem in abuse
and neglect cases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2000 (2003) (right to counsel in delinquency
cases), with id. § 7B-601 (appointment of guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect
cases); OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.245 (2003) (right to counsel in delinquency cases), with
id. § 419A.170 (appointment of "court appointed special advocate" in dependency
cases); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6337 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (right to counsel in all
juvenile proceedings), with id. § 6311 (West Supp. 2005) (appointment of guardian
ad litem in dependency cases); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7415 (1985 & Supp. 2004)
(right to counsel in all juvenile proceedings), with id. § 20-7-110 (appointment of
guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect proceedings); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-7A-30
(1999) (right to counsel in all juvenile proceedings), with id. § 26-8A-18 (appoint-
ment of guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect cases); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.140 (West 2004) (right to counsel in delinquency cases), with id. § 13.34.100
(appointment of guardian ad litem in dependency cases).
86 See ALA. CODE § 12-15-63 (LexisNexis 1995) (right to counsel), and id. § 12-15-
8 (appointment of guardian ad litem if the child "has no parent or guardian or custo-
dian appearing on his behalf or their interests conflict with those of the child");
ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.090 (2004) (appointment of guardian ad litem in addition to
counsel "[w]henever in the course of proceedings.., it appears to the court that the
welfare of a minor will be promoted"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316 (appointment of
"an attorney ad litem to represent the best-interests of a juvenile involved in any case
before the court" in addition to counsel); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-105 (West
2005) ("If the court finds that it is in the best-interest and welfare of the child, the
court may appoint both counsel and a guardian ad litem."); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6
(2002) (right to counsel), and id. § 15-11-9 (appointment of guardian ad litem in all
juvenile proceedings "if the child has no parent, guardian, or custodian appearing on
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ing language in these statutes clearly suggests, first, that the roles of
appointed advocate might vary according to the type of proceeding at
issue and, second, that the role of "counsel" must be distinguished
from that of "guardian ad litem" unless the selection of terms was
superfluous.
the child's behalf or if the interests of the parent, guardian, or custodian appearing
on the child's behalf conflict with the child's interests or in any other case in which
the interests of the child require a guardian"); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 802-1 (Lexis-
Nexis 2003) (right to counsel), and id. § 571-87 (LexisNexis 2005) (appointment of
guardian ad litem in all cases before family court); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1606 (2000)
(right to counsel), and id. § 38-1606a (appointment of "court-appointed special advo-
cate for the child ... whose primary duties shall be to advocate the best-interests of
the child" in any juvenile proceeding); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.163 (West 2003)
(right to counsel and appointment of a guardian ad litem where "it appears, at any
stage of the proceedings, that the minor is without parent or guardian, or that the
minor's parent is a minor or incompetent, or that the parent or guardian is indiffer-
ent or hostile to the minor's interests" or where "the court feels that such an appoint-
ment is desirable"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1413 (2003) (right to counsel), and id.
§ 41-5-1411 (appointment of guardian ad litem "if the youth has no parent or guard-
ian appearing in his behalf or if their interests conflict with those of the youth"); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 43-272 (2004) (appointment of guardian ad litem in addition to counsel
where "the juvenile has no parent or guardian of his or her person or if the parent or
guardian of the juvenile cannot be located or cannot be brought before the court,"
where "the parent or guardian of the juvenile is excused from participation in all or
any part of the proceedings," where "the parent is a juvenile or an incompetent," or
where "the parent is indifferent to the interests of the juvenile"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-39 (West 1987) (right to counsel and appointment of guardian ad litem);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2003) (appointment of guard-
ian ad litem in addition to counsel where "the child has no parent, guardian or custo-
dian appearing on behalf of the child or if the parent's, guardian's or custodian's
interests conflict with those of the child"); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTs LAw § 320.3 (McKinney
1999) (right to counsel and appointment of a "Law Guardian"); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-26 (1991 & Supp. 2003) (right to counsel), and id. § 27-20-48 (1991) (appoint-
ment of guardian ad litem where child "has no parent, guardian, or custodian appear-
ing on his behalf or their interests conflict with his or in any other case in which the
interest of the child require a guardian"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Lexis-
Nexis 2002) (right to counsel), and id. § 2151.281 (appointment of guardian ad litem
in any proceeding where "[t]he child has no parent, guardian, or legal custodian" or
where "the court finds that there is a conflict of interest between the child and the
child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126 (2004)
(right to counsel), and id. § 37-1-149 (Supp. 2004) (appointment of guardian ad litem
"if such child has no parent, guardian or custodian appearing on such child's behalf
or such parent's, guardian's or custodian's interests conflict with the child's or in any
other case in which the interests of the child require a guardian"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-3a-913 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (right to counsel), and id. § 78-3a-912 (appointment
of guardian ad litem in "any case before the court"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.23 (West
2000) (appointment of guardian ad litem instead of counsel for juveniles under
twelve years of age).
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Traditionally, while a "guardian ad litem" will be viewed as an
arm of the court who will advocate in the best-interest of the child,8 7
"counsel" for the child will generally have a duty of undivided loyalty
and confidentiality to the child.88 Unfortunately, although several
statutes define the term "guardian ad litem," very few define the term
"counsel."8 9 As a result, courts and practitioners often ignore or con-
flate the distinction between a guardian ad litem and counsel and
construe the role of counsel as they deem appropriate. In Ohio, for
example, judges routinely appoint advocates to serve in delinquency
cases as "attorney/guardian ad litem," notwithstanding statutes that
require appointment of "counsel" in those proceedings. 90 In Ver-
mont, the statute itself conflates the distinction between the guardian
87 William A. Kell, Voices Lost and Found: Training Ethical Lawyers for Children, 73
IND. L.J. 635, 651 (1998); Moore, supra note 80, at 1823; see also Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 938.235(3) (a) (requiring guardian ad litem to advocate for the best-interest of the
client regardless of the client's wishes); State ex rel Bird v. Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376,
384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
88 STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES 1-2, 3 (1996), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/AbuseNeglect
Standards.pdf; Moore, supra note 80, at 1842; PETERS, supra note 56, §§ 2-1 to -4.
89 For statutes that define the duties of the guardian ad litem, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.310 (2004) (guardian ad litem represents child's best-interests, to be distin-
guished from preferences, where it would serve the welfare of the child); ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (in abuse and neglect cases guardian ad litem appointed to protect
the juvenile's best-interests); ARFt CODE ANN. § 9-27-316 (attorney ad litem to re-
present the best-interests of a juvenile); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103(59)
("'Guardian ad litem' means a person appointed by a court to act in the best-interests
of a person."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129a (West 2004) (guardian ad litem
shall speak on behalf of the best-interest of the child); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1606a
(primary duties of court-appointed special advocate shall be to advocate the best-in-
terests of the child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.163(6) (guardian ad litem shall con-
duct an independent investigation to determine the facts relevant to the situation of
the child and the family, advocate for the child's best-interests and advocate for ap-
propriate community services when necessary); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-272 (Lexis-
Nexis 2004) (guardian ad litem shall have the duty to protect the interests of the
juvenile); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-1-7 (LexisNexis 1999) (guardian ad litem shall zeal-
ously represent the child's best-interests); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (guardian ad litem
is charged with representing the child's best-interests at every stage of the proceed-
ings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-912 (guardian ad litem shall represent the child's
best-interests); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.235 (3) (a) (guardian ad litem will advocate for
the best-interest of the client regardless of the clients wishes). For statute that defines
role of counsel see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.23(6) (West 2002) (defining "counsel" to
mean "an attorney acting as adversary counsel who shall advance and protect the legal
rights of the party represented, and who may not act as guardian ad litem for any
party in the same proceeding").
90 Compare OHIO ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 26, with OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.352, and In re Christopher, 376 N.E.2d 603, 607 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
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ad litem and counsel by permitting the appointment of either a guard-
ian ad litem or counsel for a child who is a party to the delinquency
proceeding.91 Similarly, in Wyoming, although the relevant statutes
require appointment of "counsel" for the child in a delinquency
case,92 the delinquency provisions confuse the role of counsel by stat-
ing first, that counsel for the child may also be the guardian ad litem
and second, that counsel "shall consider among other things what is
in the best-interest of the child."93 Still other state statutes confuse
the role of counsel by collapsing the child's right to counsel in multi-
ple types of family matters into one statute. For example, a single
statute might grant a minor the right to counsel in termination of
parental rights, custody, and delinquency proceedings. 94 These stat-
utes fail to indicate whether the role of child's counsel might be dif-
ferent in one type of family proceeding versus another.95
A final area of confusion arises in the statutory references to the
rights of parents. While many statutes recognize the potential for con-
flicts between the parent and the child and require appointment of
separate counsel for each, 96 just as many ignore the potential for con-
91 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5525 (2001); cf MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.163(4)(d)
(explicitly stating that "[c]ounsel for the child shall not also act as the child's guard-
ian ad litem").
92 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-222(b) (2005).
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 29 (LexisNexis 2002); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-201 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.211 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-
1-31 (2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-9 (LexisNexis 2004).
95 Moore, supra note 80, at 1819-20 (recognizing diversity of family, child-related
litigation). In some cases, the child will be a party to the proceeding (delinquency);
in some, the child will have some legal interest that is directly affected (contract or
property dispute); and in others, the child will only be affected indirectly by the reso-
lution of the proceeding (custody).
96 See, e.g., Apuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221E (Supp. 2004) ("If a juvenile is entitled
to counsel and there appears to be a conflict of interest between ajuvenile and the
juvenile's parent or guardian.., the juvenile court may appoint an attorney for the
juvenile in addition to the attorney appointed for the parent or guardian or employed
by the parent or guardian."); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6(b) (2002) ("If the interests of
two or more parties conflict, separate counsel shall be provided for each of them."),
and Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 229 S.E.2d 66, 69
(Ga. 1976) (recognizing that parent is a party to proceedings involving his child
under the statute that is now GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-514
(2004) (stating that the "court shall appoint counsel to represent the juvenile and his
parents or guardian . . . in the event the court shall find that there is a conflict of
interest between the interests of the juvenile and his parents or guardian, then the
court shall appoint separate counsel for the juvenile"); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 29
(parent, guardian or custodian of child shall have the right to appointed counsel at
all hearings); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.211(7) (where a conflict exists between the child
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flicts and appear to appoint one counsel to represent the interests of
both the parent and the child. 97 Ambiguities in the language of some
statutes even seem to suggest that the child may be represented by his
parent, guardian, or custodian instead of counsel.98
Statutory ambiguities regarding the role of counsel are rarely
clarified in state appellate courts. Few appellate opinions address the
role of counsel in delinquency cases because counsel rarely take ap-
peals from juvenile court cases in general and respondents are often
ill-equipped to recognize and raise the issues themselves. 99 Illinois,
West Virginia, and New Mexico are among the few states with any sig-
nificant appellate activity on the appropriate role of juvenile counsel
and the courts in these jurisdictions have reached widely diverging
and his custodian, the court "shall order that the child and his custodian be repre-
sented by separate counsel, and it shall appoint counsel if required"); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 62D.100 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003) ("A parent or guardian of a child who is
alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision may be represented by an attorney
at all stages of the proceedings."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 24(A)(2) (West 2004)
("In any case in which it appears to the court that there is such a conflict of interest
between a parent or legal guardian and a child so that one attorney could not prop-
erly represent both, the court may appoint counsel, in addition to counsel already
employed by a parent or guardian or appointed by the court to represent the minor
or parent or legal guardian.").
97 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-135(a) (West 2004) ("At the commence-
ment of any proceeding concerning the alleged delinquency of a child, the parent or
parents or guardian and the child shall have the right to counsel and be so informed
by the judge, and that if they are unable to afford counsel that counsel will be pro-
vided for them."); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5(1) (West 1999) ("[T]he mi-
nor . . . and his parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are
parties respondent have . . . the right to be represented by counsel."); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260B.163 (4) (a) (West 2003) ("The child, parent, guardian or custodian has a
right to effective assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile
court."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7415 (Supp. 2004) ("The child or the child's parent
or guardian also must be advised ... of their right to be represented by counsel and
that, if they are unable to employ counsel, counsel will be appointed to represent
them."); S.D. CODIFED LAws § 26-7A-30 (1999) ("The court shall advise the child and
the child's parents, guardian or custodian involved in any action or proceedings
under this chapter... including the right to be represented by an attorney."); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-913 (2002 & Supp. 2005) ("The parents, guardian, custodian, and
the minor, if competent, shall be informed that they have the right to be represented
by counsel."); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-222 ("At their first appearance before the court,
the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised by the court of their
right to be represented by counsel and to employ counsel of their own choice.").
98 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6 ("Counsel must be provided for a child not
represented by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian."); accord N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-26 (2003); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (LexisNexis 2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-126 (2004).
99 Berkheiser, supra note 68, at 633.
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conclusions. In a series of cases spanning from 1984 to 1995, the Ap-
pellate and Supreme Courts of Illinois explicitly held that an attorney
for the child has a duty to advocate for the best-interests of the child,
even when that interest conflicts with the expressed-interest or wishes
of the child.10 0 While each of the Illinois cases was decided in, and
thus limited to, the context of disposition (sentencing), the Illinois
courts draw from the United States Supreme Court's language in
Gault regarding the non-adversarial nature of delinquency proceed-
ings in general. 10 ' In In re R.D., the First District of the Appellate
Court of Illinois stated:
The responsibility of the court-appointed juvenile counsel . is dif-
ferent than that of other court-appointed counsel. The juvenile
counsel must not only protect thejuvenile's legal rights but he must
also recognize and recommend a disposition in the juvenile's best-
interest, even when the juvenile himself does not recognize those
interests. As our supreme court stated in In re Beasley . . . : "Al-
though such proceeding [under the Juvenile Court Act] retains cer-
tain adversary characteristics, it is not in the usual sense an
adversary proceeding, but it is one to be administered in a spirit of
humane concern for and to promote the welfare of the minor as
well as to serve the best-interests of the community." 10 2
Moreover, in at least two of the Illinois cases, the courts held that
the appointment of one public defender to serve as both a guardian
ad litem and attorney for the child does not create an inherent con-
flict of interest.10 3 In rejecting the minor's claim that his attorney's
duty to zealously advocate his wishes was in conflict with a guardian ad
litem's obligation to advocate in his best-interest, the court in In re
R.D. stated that " [w] e believe that the juvenile counsel and the guard-
ian ad litem have essentially the same obligations to the minor and to
society." 10 4
100 In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908, 918 (Ill. 1995); In re R.D., 499 N.E.2d 478, 481-82
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986); In re K-M.B., 462 N.E.2d 1271, 1272-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
101 The Court of Appeals quoted the following footnote from Gault "'Recognition
of the right to counsel involves no necessary interference with the special purposes of
juvenile court procedures; indeed, it seems that counsel can play an important role in
the process of rehabilitation.'" K.M.B., 462 N.E.2d at 1273 (quoting In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 38 n.64 (1967)); see also WC., 657 N.E.2d at 918 (noting that the process "for
the most part is nonadversarial").
102 RD., 499 N.E.2d at 481-82 (citation omitted); see also K.M.B., 462 N.E.2d at
1273 (relying on same quoted expert from Illinois Supreme Court in In re Beasley,
362 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ill. 1977)).
103 RD., 499 N.E.2d at 481-82; K.M.B., 462 N.E.2d at 1272-73.
104 RD., 499 N.E.2d at 482.
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The appellate decisions in West Virginia have endorsed a radi-
cally different role for counsel in delinquency cases. In the key West
Virginia case, the state supreme court held that counsel for the child
has an affirmative duty to provide active and vigorous representation
at both the adjudicatory and disposition stages of a delinquency
case.10 5 The court reprimanded the trial court for interfering with the
attorney's "energetic advocacy" at the disposition phase and con-
cluded that the court must accommodate an adversarial proceeding
and allow counsel to make a record at all stages of the proceedings.1 0 6
In New Mexico, the state supreme court placed itself somewhere
between the rulings in Illinois and West Virginia. In June 2004, the
New Mexico supreme court was asked to decide whether defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he served as both guard-
ian ad litem during the child's abuse and neglect case and then as
defense attorney for the child during delinquency proceedings.107
Despite the child's argument that the dual roles presented an inher-
ent and irreconcilable conflict, the court found no "actual, active"
conflict and denied the ineffectiveness claim.' 08 Although the court
explicitly acknowledged the "heightened" potential for conflicts and
provided a rather lengthy analysis of the differences between the loyal-
ties and obligations of defense counsel and guardian ad litem, the
court was unwilling to adopt a per se rule barring dual appointments
absent evidence of an actual conflict.10 9
The rulings in West Virginia, Illinois, and New Mexico represent
the disparity in common law interpretations of the role of counsel in
delinquency cases. The absence of appellate insight in other jurisdic-
tions may further explain the lack of uniformity in juvenile practice
across the country.
3. Practical Difficulties Caused by Cognitive Limitations of
Children
In discussing normative and systemic barriers to traditional ex-
pressed-interest advocacy, it would be a mistake to ignore the real im-
pact a child's cognitive and developmental limitations may have on
the attorney-client relationship. Zealous advocacy of the client's ex-
105 State ex reL D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 412 (W. Va. 1980).
106 Id. at 413 (noting that the court of appeals reprimanded the trial judge for
holding the child's counsel in contempt and removing him from the appointed repre-
sentation when the attorney attempted to arrange for alternative placements).
107 State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d 783, 784 (N.M. 2004).
108 Id. at 787.
109 Id.
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pressed-interests depends not only on the attorney's willingness to de-
fer to the child's decisions, but also on the child's ability to make and
communicate those decisions.110 The attorney may face real chal-
lenges in allocating decisions to children who generally have a limited
fund of information, sometimes lack the capacity to engage in effec-
tive cognitive reasoning, often exercise poor and/or short-sighted
value judgments, and frequently err in predicting future outcomes.
Psychologists studying common cognitive and psychosocial fea-
tures of adolescence have recently questioned adolescents' abilities to
participate effectively as trial defendants.111 The literature emerging
from these studies has begun to influence the debate on the appropri-
ate role of counsel in the juvenile justice system.11 2 Research seems to
indicate that even a child who has the cognitive capacity to meet the
legal criteria for competence to stand trial may still have certain devel-
opmental limitations that impair his effective participation in the at-
torney-client relationship.1 13 Although it appears that by the age of
fifteen a child is able to engage in the same communication and cog-
nitive reasoning process as an adult,1 4 the capacity to engage in cog-
nitive reasoning is not the sole determinant in decisionmaking.11 5
Some youth simply lack the knowledge and experience needed to
conceive of and weigh all of the short- and long-range consequences
that should be considered in any given decision. 116 Developmental
research also suggests that risk perception, risk preference, and time
perspective often differ between adolescents and adults and generally
affect how cognitive capacities will be used in decisionmaking. 117 Ad-
olescents, for example, often engage in more risk-taking behavior be-
110 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 176.
111 Id. at 191; Jennifer L. Woolard & N. Dickon Reppucci, Researching Juveniles'
Capacities as Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 173, 176-79.
112 See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles' Competence as De-
fendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 243, passim; Schmidt et al., supra note
57, passim; Scott, supra note 82, passim; Woolard & Reppucci, supra note 111, passim.
113 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 176-77; see also Buss, supra note 112, at 243.
114 Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 3, 17-18 (1997); Scott, supra note 82, at 555-56,
115 See Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 176-77; see also Barry C. Feld, Competence,
Culpability, and Punishment: Implications ofAtkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents,
32 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 463, 505 (2003); William A. Kell, Ties That Bind? Children's Attor-
neys, Children's Agency, and the Dilemma of Parental Affiliation, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 353,
362-63 (1998); Woolard & Reppucci, supra note 111, at 176.
116 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 177; see also Buss, supra note 112, at 243; Scott,
supra note 82, at 555-56, 591 (inexperience and immature judgments may lead to
poor choices).
117 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 180; Scott, supra note 82, at 591-92.
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cause they think with a more immediate rather than future
orientation and thus perceive risks differently.118 Because children
and adolescents tend to focus on immediate gains and fail to consider
the long-term, future consequences of a given choice, their decisions
may be based on a temporary set of beliefs, and values that are likely
to change over time. 119 As adolescents mature, they gain a greater
appreciation of the future, adopt new values and beliefs and often
become more risk averse. 120 These adolescents may also come to re-
gret decisions they made in earlier years.
Decisionmaking is also shaped by context and environment. Peo-
ple who make decisions in stressful situations often make bad deci-
sions or avoid decisions altogether by shifting responsibility to another
person or by settling for the status quo.121 Research suggests that
youth rely on their cognitive reasoning skills with even less dependa-
bility and uniformity than adults in stressful settings. 12 2 When the
child's attorney lacks training in adolescent development and does
not have or take the time to confront and resolve the anxiety that any
child is likely to experience in a delinquency case, the child may never
effectively engage in the decisionmaking process.
Likewise, the child's decisionmaking capacity may be inhibited
when the attorney fails to earn his client's trust. 12 3 A few studies have
raised concerns about the difficulties children have in developing a
trusting relationship with an attorney and in understanding the con-
cepts of confidentiality and client loyalty.12 4 Some children mistak-
118 Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 88; Buss, supra note 112, at 249; J.
Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and the Indetermi-
native Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 112 (2003); Schmidt et al.,
supra note 57, at 180; Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychol-
ogy Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 9, 23-28.
119 Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 91 (noting that youth tend to favor immedi-
ate benefits "such as looking 'cool' in the eyes of peers"); Feld, supra note 115, at
506-07; Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 179-80.
120 Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 88; Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 179.
121 See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE
APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING § 8-4, at 141, § 8-4(c), at 146
(1999); Woolard & Reppucci, supra note 111, at 183.
122 Buss, supra note 112, at 918-19; Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 179; Woolard
& Reppucci, supra note 111, at 183.
123 See Buss, supra note 9, at 1712-14 (noting that a lawyer's failure to earn a
child's trust and explain the lawyer's role can impair the child's ability to make deci-
sions in the traditional client context).
124 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, 177-78; see also Grisso, supra note 114, at 15-16
(discussing results of several studies); Tamara Wong, Comment, Adolescent Minds,
Adult Crimes: Assessing a Juvenile's Mental Health and Capacity To Stand Trial, 6 U.C.
DAVISJ.Juv. L. & POL'v 163, 180-81 (2002) (citing Deborah Cooper, Juveniles' Under-
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enly believe that lawyers are responsible for deciding issues of guilt
and punishment, that lawyers are required to report a child's admis-
sion of guilt to the court, or that a lawyer will not advocate the client's
interests if the child admits involvement in the offense. I 25 It is also
fair to assume that few children fully understand their right to assert a
directive role in the attorney-client relationship. Even when there is
no confusion regarding the attorney's loyalty, children are generally
socialized to expect adults to make decisions for them and may defer
to the lawyer by default. 126
The cognitive and psychosocial variables identified here may im-
pact the attorney-client relationship in any number of ways. Most ob-
viously, a child who is unpersuaded by his attorney's loyalty may
simply withhold information from the attorney, depriving both the at-
torney and the child of an opportunity to exchange important insights
in the case.127 An adolescent who lacks future orientation may also
withhold information from his attorney in order to feel the immediate
benefit of not fully incriminating himself, but fail to recognize the
long-term costs of compromising his own defense. 128 Youth may also
make plea and trial decisions based on what their current peers think,
failing to recognize that peer groups change and the long-term conse-
quences of their choices may not comport with future values. In other
encounters with the attorney, the youth may neglect to share informa-
tion with the attorney simply because he or she miscalculates its im-
portance to the case or does not fully understand the legal rights at
stake. 129
The attorney-client relationship is often further complicated by
the prevalence of mental health issues among youth in the juvenile
standing of Trial Related Information: Are They Competent Defendants?, 15 BEYAV. SCI. & L.
167 (1997)) (discussing a survey of 112 juveniles in South Carolina system which
showed that generally, juveniles did not understand the role of defense counsel).
125 Grisso, supra note 114, at 19-20.
126 Manmus, supra note 8, at 342 ("Children naturally look to authority figures to
make decisions for them.").
127 Buss, supra note 112, at 248; Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 177, 186 (showing
that juveniles were less likely than adults to recommend that clients talk to the attor-
ney and be honest with attorney); Ann Tobey et al., Youths' Trial Participation as Seen by
Youths and Their Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL,
supra note 11, at 225, 232-34; Wong, supra note 124, at 181.
128 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 180.
129 Berkheiser, supra note 68, at 629-30 (citing studies by Thomas Grisso finding
juveniles unlikely to understand either the rights they are being asked to waive or the
consequences of waiving them).
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justice system.13 0 Studies suggest that the percentage of incarcerated
youth with mental health disorders is much higher than that of the
general juvenile population.' 3 ' The disorders most prevalent among
incarcerated youth include conduct disorder, depression, attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, learning disabilities, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and developmental disabilities. 132 For 0children, atten-
tion deficit/hyperactivity disorder and some learning disabilities can
make already difficult tasks like remembering and communicating
events practically impossible.'l 3 Depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder may render the child unmotivated to assist counsel or help
himself.
Because best-interest advocacy does not depend on the child's
cognitive capacity, decisionmaking skills or ability to communicate
with counsel, the model continues to thrive in the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Unless real and perceived cognitive and psychosocial limitations
among children and adolescents can be corrected or accommodated
in the delinquency context, attorneys will have difficulty maintaining a
traditional attorney-client relationship with the child.' 34
4. Failure of Model Rules of Professional Conduct to Provide
Adequate Guidance for Attorneys Who Represent Children
When the role of counsel is framed in terms of the client's capac-
ity to direct or engage with the advocate, the attorney may look to
standards of professional ethics for guidance. Unfortunately, ambigu-
ities in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are comparable to
those in the language of Gault and do little to clarify the role of child's
counsel in delinquency cases. The natural starting point for any dis-
cussion of the lawyer's ethical obligations on behalf of children is
130 See Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making
of Delinquent Youths ("An examination of decision-making abilities among delinquent
youths must take into consideration the fact that, as a group, these youths have a
much higher rate of mental disorders than do adolescents in general."), in YOUTH ON
TRIAL, supra note 11, at 33, 34; Wong, supra note 124, at 183 (reporting that "a high
percentage of mentally retarded or borderline mentally retarded young people in the
juvenile justice system contribute [s] to the inability of juvenile clients to assist
counsel").
131 See National Mental Health Ass'n, Children with Emotional Disorders in the Juvenile
Justice System, http://www.nmha.org/children/justjuv/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 23,
2005) (recognizing that the percentage may be as high as sixty to seventy-five
percent).
132 See id.
133 See Wong, supra note 124, at 182.
134 See infra Part III for discussion of how attorneys might enhance child's evolv-
ing decisionmaking capacities.
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Model Rule 1.14, which instructs the attorney to maintain a "normal"
relationship with his client, as far as reasonably possible, even when a
client's decisionmaking capacity is diminished by youth. 3 5 Although
Rule 1.14 endorses a presumptively normal attorney-client relation-
ship, the rule also excuses an attorney from that norm when the client
risks substantial physical, financial, or other harm and cannot ade-
quately protect his own interests.13 6 Thus counsel's interpretation of
his or her role turns on the presumptions he makes about the child's
capacity to act in his own interest.
The disparity in role assumption among juvenile defense counsel
across the country suggests that Rule 1.14 has failed one of its primary
objectives-that of developing uniformity in practice.'3 7 Prior to
2002, attorneys across all subject matters and with opposing views on
the role of counsel almost uniformly agreed that Rule 1.14 had been
useless in providing any meaningful guidance to attorneys who re-
present minors or other persons of potentially diminished capacity.
Advocates for mentally disabled clients complained that Rule 1.14 of-
fered very little guidance for the lawyer attempting to make a thresh-
old determination of whether the client is impaired.13 8  Elder
advocates complained that the rule failed to provide or recommend
any tools the advocate might use to measure the client's capacity to
make case-related decisions.' 3 9 Child's advocates found the rule both
unrealistic and unhelpful in encouraging the lawyer to develop and
maintain a normal attorney-client relationship with the child;140 and
parents-rights advocates argued that the absence of guidance in the
135 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.14(a) (2003).
136 Id. R. 1.14(b).
137 E. Norman Veasey, Commission on the Evaluation of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct ("Ethics 2000"): Chair's Introduction (Feb. 2000) ("One of the pri-
mary reasons behind the decision to revisit the Model Rules was the growing disparity
in state ethics codes."), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/e2kschair-in-
tro.html.
138 See, e.g., Daniel L. Bray & Michael D. Ensley, Dealing with the Mentally Incapaci-
tated Client: The Ethical Issues Facing the Attorney, 33 FAro. L.Q. 329, 333 (1999).
139 See, e.g., Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-
What's an Attorney To Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 1101, 1138 (1994) (complaining that "[t]he rule does not state which of the
many tests and medical models for determining competency the lawyer should use in
exercising this judgment. It offers no clue about how to determine task-specific, par-
tial, or intermittent incapacity, nor does it acknowledge what an unrealistic expecta-
tion it places on lawyers.").
140 See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 83, at 1401 (discussing the interests of the
child advocate).
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rules gave attorneys complete discretion in deciding whether or not to
follow the child's wishes at all.14 '
In 1997, the ABA convened the Ethics 2000 Commission to re-
write the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 142 and specifically ad-
dress issues of client capacity.1 43 Although there were significant
changes to Rule 1.14 by February 2002, it is not at all clear that the
revised rule will generate any more uniformity than it has in the
past. 144 Rule 1.14 was included in the Ethics 2000 Proposed Workplan
specifically at the behest of child advocates who complained that the
rule offered virtually no guidance for lawyers representing chil-
dren.145 Thereafter, the Commission held a series of public meetings
and solicited input from the legal community regarding the proposed
revisions. For some reason, after the initial Ethics 2000 Proposed
Workplan, child advocates disappeared from the Commission process
and advocates from the elder bar assumed a leadership role in efforts
to revise Rule 1.14.146 This shift in leadership was significant given
141 See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 82, at 451 (discussing the interests of the parents-
rights advocate).
142 Veasey, supra note 137, at xv (stating that in determining the extent of the
client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as:
the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of
mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of
a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments
and values of the client).
143 See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, ETHICS 2000 PROPOSED WORK PLAN:
ISSUES To BE CONSIDERED [hereinafter ETHics 2000 PROPOSED WoRK PLAN], available
at http://abanet.org/cpr/wkpliss.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2005) (examining Rule
1.14).
144 Compare Michael D. Drews & Pamela Halprin, Note, Determining the Effective Rep-
resentation of a Child in Our Legal System: Do Current Standards Accomplish the Goal?, 40
FAm. CT. REv. 383, 386 (2002) (contending that "Rule 1.14, as it currently exists, lacks
the specificity necessary to regulate representatives of children"), and Richard Miller,
Secret Keeper or Tattletale: Incursions Upon the Attorney-Client Privilege, ORANGE COUNTY
LAW., Feb. 2002, at 4, 4 (2002) (expressing some dissatisfaction with the rule revi-
sions), with Edward Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, Lauyer Acting as Guardians:
Policy and Ethical Considerations, 31 STETSON L. REv. 791, 822 (2002) (suggesting that
new rule provides more guidance), and A. Frank Johns & Charles P. Sabatino, Wing-
span-The Second National Guardianship Conference, 31 STETSON L. REv. 573, 587 (2002)
(expressing consensus among elder advocates that revisions provide greater
guidance).
145 See ETHICS 2000 PROPOSED WoRK PLAN, supra note 143.
146 The Minutes from the meetings of the Ethics 2000 Commission show extensive
participation by the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA), and some
lesser participation by the Commission on Legal Problems for the Elderly (CLPE) and
Legal Services for the Elderly between 1997 and 2002. The president of NAELA, A.
Frank Johns, testified before the Commission. See Ethics 2000 Comm'n, Ctr. for
[VOL. 8 1:1
LOYALTY, PATERNALISM, AND RIGHTS
that elder advocates tend to favor greater lawyer decisionmaking, 147
while child advocacy scholars tend to reject paternalistic, best-interest
advocacy in favor of traditional client-directed advocacy. 148
Recent commentary among elder advocates reveals a growing
concern about the possible negative impact of individual client auton-
omy in the resolution of common legal issues. In particular, commen-
tators have suggested that it may be unfair to honor an elder's
decision when that decision may be self-destructive or burden the
elder's family with responsibilities of increased emotional and physical
support. 149 Elder advocates who testified before the Ethics 2000 Com-
mission actively encouraged the Commission to move away from the
"morality of individualism" and to adopt a more communitarian con-
struct of representation.1 50 Advocates also lobbied for revisions that
would allow greater flexibility in assessing client capacity for purposes
of Rule 1.14 and for new language in Rules 1.7 and 1.14 that would
permit and even encourage 'Joint, multiple and family entity repre-
Prof'l Responsibility, Minutes of Meeting in Atlanta, Ga. (Aug. 6-8, 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/080699mtg.html. In addition, Johns issued written re-
marks discussing NAELA's position. See A. Frank Johns, President, NAELA, Written
Remarks to Ethics 2000 Comm'n (May 19, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/naela600.html; A. Frank Johns, President, NAELA, Written Remarks to Ethics
2000 Comm'n (Feb. 8, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/naela2.html; A.
Frank Johns, President, NAELA, Written Remarks to Ethics 2000 Comm'n (July 12,
1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/naela899.html.
147 Peter Margulies, Access, Connection and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Represent-
ing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073 (1994); Nancy M.
Maurer & Patricia W. Johnson, Ethical Conflicts in Representing People with Questionable
Capacity (114 PLI/NY, 3d ed. 2002), in REPRESENTING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, 1-1, at
1-8, 1-23; see also Rein, supra note 139, at 1160-62.
148 Drews & Halprin, supra note 144, at 383; Peters, supra note 56, at ch. 2 (criticiz-
ing best-interest model as unduly paternalistic and failing to give due regard to child's
wishes); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (showing a sampling of opinions
in support of the traditional adversary model of advocacy).
149 See, e.g., Rein, supra note 139, at 1132. Professor Jan Rein, for example,
strongly criticizes the "staunch and unfettered" individualism of the Western legal
world and argues that attorneys should serve as "gatekeepers" for the community. Id.
at 1103-05, 1146. While she does recognize the value of individual autonomy, Profes-
sor Rein calls for a balancing of that autonomy with the legitimately competing family
and social interests and for better mechanisms for attorneys who must deal with the
destructive and anti-social choices of their clients. Id. at 1102-04, 1116-17.
150 See A. Frank Johns, President, NAELA, Written Remarks to Ethics 2000
Comm'n (July 12, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/naela2.html (dis-
cussing amendments to Rule 1.7).
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sentation" and facilitate greater attorney communication or consulta-
tion with the client's relatives and other interested persons.1 5 1
Although the Ethics 2000 Commission did not explicitly adopt a
communitarian, family unit construct of representation, the revisions
did respond to and accommodate many of the elder bar concerns.
Most significantly, the Commission honored the elder bar's request
for greater flexibility in assessing capacity and revised language
throughout Rule 1.14 to reflect that theme. Specifically, the Commis-
sion changed the "disability" nomenclature to "capacity," thereby mov-
ing away from the binary construct of disabled and nondisabled to
consider capacity along a continuum that gives attorneys more leeway
to determine that a client lacks the capacity to make certain deci-
sions. 15 2 The addition of new Commentary also responded to the
elder bar's request for more leeway in talking to relatives of the cli-
ents.' 53 The Commentary now allows the client to include family
members and other persons in discussions with the lawyer and sug-
gests that the attorney-client privilege might extend when a client of
some diminished capacity needs and seeks the inclusion. 54
Yet, notwithstanding the move towards greater flexibility in the
capacity assessment, nothing in the Ethics 2000 revisions dismantles
the presumption of and preference for a normal attorney-client rela-
tionship. Even where the client's capacity is diminished, "the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer re-
lationship with the client."'155 New Commentary added by the Ethics
2000 Commission reiterates that the client's interests must remain
foremost and that the attorney should intrude on the client's decision-
151 Id.; see alsoJohns & Sabatino, supra note 144, at 587-89 (discussing the propos-
als of the Second National Guardianship Conference); Minutes from the ABA Ctr. for
Prof'l Responsibility Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Profl Conduct (Aug. 6-8,
1999) [hereinafter CPR Comm'n], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
080699mtg.html.
152 SeeJohns & Sabatino, supra note 144, at 587-89; CPR Comm'n, supra note 151
(indicating presence of NAELA and CLPE, each of whom indicated that their agen-
cies preferred more flexibility).
153 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2003); see also CTR. FOR
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ABA, ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION REPORT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 [herein-
after ETHICS 2000 COMM'N REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule
114.html (comparing the 2000 revised rules with the former rules).
154 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3; see also ETHICS 2000 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (comparing the 2000 revised rules with the
former rules).
155 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a); see also ETHICS 2000 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14(a) (comparing the 2000 revised rules with the former
rules).
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making to the least extent possible. 156 Even when the attorney is
given flexibility to consult with the client's family members, the attor-
ney must look to the client, and not to a family member to make deci-
sions on the client's behalf.1
57
The capacity assessment also clearly remains at the threshold of
any deviation from the norm. Unless the client lacks sufficient capac-
ity to communicate or make adequately considered decisions on his
own, the attorney must abide by all of the dictates of the normal attor-
ney-client relationship.158 Unfortunately, the rule's continued ambi-
guity lies yet again in its failure to define terms like capacity and its
failure to guide attorneys in deciding when capacity is so diminished
that it warrants intervention or deviation from the traditional advo-
cate model. Although the new commentary does identify some factors
the attorney should consider in evaluating the client's capacity, 159 the
attorney is left with considerable discretion to apply the factors in any
given context. In child advocacy, normative preferences and broad
philosophical differences among those interpreting Rule 1.14 may
preempt any real individualized assessment of the client's cognitive
and decisional capacity. 160 By adopting bright-line or rebuttable age
presumptions regarding capacity,' 61 commentators and practitioners
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3; see also ETHICS 2000 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (comparing the 2000 revised rules with the
former rules).
157 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3; see also ETHICS 2000 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (comparing the 2000 revised rules with the
former rules).
158 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5; see also ETHICS 2000 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (comparing the 2000 revised rules with the
former rules).
159 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 6; see also ETHICS 2000 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 6 (comparing the 2000 revised rules with the
former rules) ("In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the
lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate
reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate
consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency
of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client.").
160 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
161 For examples of bright-line generalizations about children's capacity, see STAN-
DARDS FOR ATTORNEYS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM IN CUSTODY OR VISITATION PROCEED-
INGS 2.2 (Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Law 1994) (presuming capacity at age 12);Joan-
Margaret Kun, Rejecting the Adage "Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard"-The Mature
MinorDoctrine, 16 PACE L. REv. 423, 431 (1996) (discussing the decisionmaking capac-
ity of children in the medical treatment context, noting the common law "Rule of
Sevens," which creates a rebuttable presumption of lack of capacity for children be-
tween the ages of seven and fourteen, and a rebuttable presumption of capacity for
children older than fourteen); Laffitte, supra note 9, at 331 (discussing the decision-
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who support best-interest advocacy might categorically excuse the at-
torney from a normal attorney-client relationship when representing
any child below a specified age and argue for the transfer of decision-
making authority from the child to an adult such as the attorney or
the parent.162
II. BEST-INTEREST AND SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT MODELS IN
DELINQUENCY CASES
Considering real and perceived limitations in a child's decision-
making capacity, combined with normative and systemic barriers to
child and adolescent autonomy, it is unlikely that the attorney-client
relationship in delinquency cases will ever completely mirror that in
adult criminal cases. However, current impediments to a normal at-
torney-child relationship may not be so insurmountable as to require
or justify a model of advocacy that differs so radically from the repre-
sentation of adults. In delinquency cases, like criminal cases, the at-
torney-client paradigm must give substantive meaning to the child's
constitutional right to counsel, comport with notions of fundamental
fairness and due process, and satisfy the Model Rules' at least nominal
preference for client loyalty and autonomy. 163 To the greatest extent
possible, the juvenile paradigm should also accommodate and en-
hance the child's cognitive, emotional, and psychosocial development
and not impede the successful rehabilitation of children in the juve-
nile justice system.
The remainder of this Article looks to see which, if any, of the
existing attorney-client frameworks might best accommodate the goals
and objectives of juvenile court. Parts II and III move beyond the bi-
nary best-interest/expressed-interest dichotomy for a more nuanced
examination of the continuum of possible attorney-client paradigms.
making capacity of children in the context of Rule 1.14, noting arguments that "the
age seven is more likely than not the age at which a child can handle decisions, but
that the age of seven should not be determinative in all cases").
162 See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 82. Hafen is a parental rights advocate who accepts
presumption of incapacity because children are incapable of exercising reasoned
judgment, but does not cite any social science research regarding the cognitive and/
or psychosocial capacity of children.
163 The Model Rules' commitment to client loyalty and autonomy are evident in a
number of the rules. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (allocating
decisions regarding the objectives of the case to the client); id. R. 1.6 (requiring the
lawyer to maintain the client's confidences and secrets); id. R. 1.7 (instructing the
lawyer to avoid conflicts of interest between himself and his client); id. R. 1.14 (re-
quiring the lawyer to strive for a normal attorney-client relationship even when the
client is of diminished capacity).
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Part II looks first at the range of best-interest and substituted judg-
ment models, paying particular attention to attorney-directed advo-
cacy, parent-directed advocacy, and the substituted judgment
doctrine. While I acknowledge the rationale that might support the
transfer of decisionmaking authority from the child to an adult in the
best-interest model, I conclude that best-interest advocacy overcom-
pensates for differences between children and adults, makes no effort
to enhance or develop the evolving cognitive capacity of children, and
ultimately denies children fundamental due process within the juve-
nile justice system. Part II also questions whether either an attorney
or a parent can ever adequately determine the best-interest of the
child without the child's input and concludes that best-interest advo-
cacy may actually hinder rehabilitative goals by alienating the child at
best and engendering the child's hostility at worst.
A. Attorney-Guided, Best-Interest of the Child Model
1. Rationale/Justification
When we consider legitimate concerns about ceding authority to
children who often have limited cognitive ability and immature, short-
sighted value systems, it is not surprising that best-interest advocacy
has thrived so long after the adoption of the IJA-ABA Standards. The
best-interest model actually appears to have grown directly out of a
belief that children are not able to recognize or act in accord with
their own best-interests. 164 Thus some more experienced, rational
adult must be given authority to make important decisions in the
child's life.
Transferring decisionmaking from an accused juvenile to an at-
torney who will act in the child's best-interest may make sense if we
assume that children and adolescents are incapable of reasoned and
thoughtful judgment regarding the myriad of decisions that must be
made in the course of litigation. The objective but concerned advo-
cate will draw from the wisdom he has gained in his own life exper-
iences and make decisions with the child's long-term interests in
mind. Presumably, at each decision point in the case, the attorney will
identify a wider range of options than the child, recognize more of
the possible outcomes and consequences, and better weigh the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each option. Even if the lawyer's decisions
do not satisfy the immediate and temporary values of the child, the
164 Davis, supra note 60, at 826-27; seeJan C. Costello, Ethical Issues in Representing
Juvenile Clients: A Review of the IJA-ABA Standards on Representing Private Parties, 10 N.M.
L. REv. 255, 258 (1980).
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decisions should be acceptable to the child upon reflection as a ma-
ture adult.
The best-interest model may also respond to concerns that chil-
dren are poor information providers. 165 A best-interest advocate, like
a guardian ad litem, generally does not consider himself bound by
the strict requirements of the attorney-client privilege and confidenti-
ality.166 With greater freedom to communicate outside of the attor-
ney-client relationship, the attorney may gather and exchange
information with the court and the child's relatives, school officials,
and neighbors. Because the attorney no longer depends on the child
for information, inherent distrust between the child and his lawyer
will arguably be less detrimental in the case.
The best-interest model is also very much in keeping with the his-
torical agenda of the juvenile court-to rehabilitate children. In the
rehabilitative court, the advocate acting in the best-interest of his cli-
ent joins a team of court officials who will develop a plan to turn the
child from a life of crime and prepare him to be a productive member
of society. If the team is genuinely committed to serving the child's
best-interest, then the advocate may feel comfortable assisting in the
team's efforts and be less concerned about due process. By advocat-
ing in the child's best-interests, the attorney may also appease the im-
patientjudge and secure a better outcome for his or her client. Given
the ambiguities in Gault, state right-to-counsel statutes, and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, many advocates find little that formally
or definitively prohibits them from assuming this paternalistic role in
advocacy.
2. Limitations of the Best-Interest Model
While the best-interest model does appear to compensate for
many of the difficulties encountered between children and adults in
the traditional attorney-client relationship, the model appears to
165 See Buss, supra note 56, at 927-28 (discussing the difficulties faced by attorneys
in communicating with their child clients); Federle, supra note 61, at 1689 (noting
that a child's "limited liguistic and cognitive capabilities" may result in the child being
unable to clearly express herself); Tobey et al., supra note 127, at 232-33 (describing
youths' difficulties in expressing themselves in court and to their attorneys, due to
reasons such as emotional issues, frustration, and lack of familiarity with counsel).
166 See Buss, supra note 9, at 1743-44 (lawyer zealously advocating for client's best-
interests not bound to keep information secret); Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret:
Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHiCS 509, 533-34 (1998) (best-interest model of counsel in delinquency proceed-
ings may lead counsel to reveal privileged information to the court if counsel believes
it is in the child's best-interest).
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overcompensate for those difficulties by accepting without testing
broad trends and generalizations about children and adolescents and
by neglecting to account for individual differences among children
along the developmental continuum.1 67 The model also ignores re-
medial efforts that might enhance the decisionmaking capacity of
youth and makes no effort to accommodate for differences between
children and adults. Even more important, the best-interest model
remains at odds with certain fundamental rights and principles of
American jurisprudence, including the long-standing commitment to
personal autonomy, respect for individual decisionmaking, and the
guarantee of due process when liberty interests are at stake. 168
a. Best-Interest Model Makes No Effort To Accommodate
Differences Between Children and Adults and May
Hinder Rehabilitation of Children in Juvenile
Justice System
Attorneys all too often accept without testing the presumption
that children and adolescents lack the capacity to reason through de-
cisions presented to them. Practitioners remain bound to formulaic
determinations of competence versus incompetence and fail to recog-
nize that cognitive capacity varies widely among children and adoles-
cents. 169 Even worse, the concept of adolescence is often lost in the
binary construct of children versus adults. °70 This "loss" of adoles-
cence is particularly detrimental in juvenile courts where delinquency
is most common between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, with the
167 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on
Serious Juvenile Crime: When Should Juveniles Be Treated as Adults?, 63 FED. PROBATION 52,
53 (1999).
168 Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 82; see also Guggenheim, supra note 83, at
1405-06 (arguing that individual autonomy is central principle from which all issues
regarding the role of counsel should be discussed); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent
Counsel for Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 349, 353 (1993) (arguing that our emphasis on indi-
vidual ights and personal autonomy are furthered by a role of attorney which enables
litigants to pursue and protect their legal rights); Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting
the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 2075, 2076 (1996) (arguing that control over the decisionmaking
process lies at the heart of the American legal system when personal legal fights are at
stake). But see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979) (noting that the "tradi-
tion of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty");
Hafen, supra note 82, at 423.
169 SeeJanet E. Ainsworth, Juvenile Justice: Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to
Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. Rrv. 927, 939-40 (1995); Scott, supra note
82, at 549, 559-60.
170 See Scott, supra note 82, at 548, 557.
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greatest concentration around age sixteen. 171 Often the law treats ad-
olescents like children, rendering them presumptively dependent and
incompetent. 17 2
The best-interest advocate also fails to recognize reasoned deci-
sionmaking as an acquired skill that varies according to context, expe-
rience, and instruction. 173 The advocate considers any evidence of
diminished capacity as proof of the child's incompetence to assist
counsel or participate in trial. Yet, instead of raising a potentially le-
gitimate competency issue with the court, 1 74 the best-interest advocate
simply ignores the client's wishes and substitutes his own view of what
is best for the child. Unfortunately, attorneys who neglect to talk with
their clients miss a valuable opportunity to enhance the child's deci-
sionmaking capacity. These attorneys fail to recognize that a child
who is well counseled in the trusting and safe environment of his law-
yer's office may render thoughtful, well reasoned case-related deci-
sions even if he is likely to exercise poor judgment and make bad
choices on the street or in peer-to-peer interactions. 175
Moreover, even accepting that many youth and adolescents will
have cognitive and psychosocial limitations that affect judgment, the
risk of harm from such limitations is significantly reduced in the delin-
quency context because the child is rarely the final decisionmaker on
171 Id. at 593-94 ("Criminal behavior is rare in early adolescence; it increases
through age sixteen, and decreases sharply from age seventeen onward.").
172 Id. at 548, 557. However, modem legislative initiatives suggest that law and
order politicians are shifting older juveniles from the status of children to that of
adult so that they may be transferred and tried in adult courts when they are charged
with crime. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227 (West 2005) (allowing for discretion-
ary and mandatory charging in adult court for children between ages of fourteen and
seventeen meeting specified criteria).
173 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-4, at 8-9. A child's sense of morality also
grows/changes with trial and error in practice. Id. § 9-2(a), at 170.
174 In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), the Supreme Court outlined a
two-part legal standard for determining whether a defendant was competent to stand
trial. A defendant will be deemed competent if he has "a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him" and "sufficient present ability to con-
sult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Id. at 402.
Competency standards have been applied to juvenile proceedings in many jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., Golden v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000); In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d
1264, 1267 (D.C. 1990); In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); In re
Carey, 615 N.W.2d 742, 746-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507,
510 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). See generally Grisso, supra note 114 (discussing competency
assessment to include understanding of legal process, appreciation of significance of
legal circumstances for their defense, ability to communicate information to counsel,
and reasoning and judgment in making decisions as defendants).
175 See Buss, supra note 56, at 918-19.
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any issue. 176 Because delinquency cases are adversarial hearings in
which the judge makes the final decision about issues such as deten-
tion, guilt, innocence, and disposition, the attorney may give the child
authority to guide the procedural direction of the case but cannot
permit the child to avoid any rehabilitative services the judge or pro-
bation officer ultimately deems necessary. Thus, even where the child
wisely or unwisely instructs his attorney t6 advocate for his release
from detention back to the community, the judge will ultimately de-
cide whether that release is appropriate. Likewise, although the child
may instruct his attorney to litigate Fourth Amendment issues that
might result in dismissal of the charges and loss of treatment for the
child, final decisions about suppression of evidence and dismissal of
cases remain for the judge to decide based on fundamental constitu-
tional principles. Ultimately, issues of public safety and the welfare of
the child should be protected through the judicial process, not by
manipulating the attorney-client relationship or limiting the child's
participation in his own case.
In fact, a model of advocacy that denies the child a meaningful
voice in the attorney-client relationship, and thus in the juvenile jus-
tice system as a whole, may actually hinder the rehabilitative and pub-
lic safety objectives of the court.177 The client who is excluded from
the process will be less likely to disclose important information, less
likely to follow through on necessary steps in the case and less likely to
comply with orders issued by a judge who has never heard or consid-
ered the child's views.1 78 Without critical insight from the child, the
diagnostic team assigned to develop the child's disposition plan is
likely to rely on an inaccurate or incomplete picture of the child's
needs. In addition, the child who perceives the best-interest model to
be unfair 179 and resents the exclusion of his voice from the proceed-
ings may also rebel against the court's treatment plan and refuse to
follow through with counseling, probation meetings, curfew, and
176 See id. at 905.
177 See Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation, 71 U.
CIN. L. REv. 89, 93-96 (2002) (arguing that the more a juvenile feels like he or she
had a voice in the proceedings, the more likely he or she is to initiate healing and
improve future behavior).
178 See CJCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-3(a), at 115.
179 MAINE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 27 (quoting ajuvenile as saying, "The attor-
ney is the buddy of the probation officer. I feel like I don't have anyone to defend
me."); WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 51 ("1 think [the attorneys] will do
whatever they want. It's important to listen. They do not really understand me. They
are all set on what THEY are going to say and do-instead of just listening to me")
(alteration in original); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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other treatment requirements. 180 In this way, the best-interest model
ultimately deprives the child of a sense of justice and impedes efforts
to make the child a responsible member of society.1 81 In the end, the
risks and consequences of excluding the child's voice from the pro-
cess may warrant deference to the child in the attorney-client relation-
ship even when the child is not fully mature or lacks optimal cognitive
capacity.
b. Best-Interest Advocacy Does Not Comport with Model Rules
of Professional Conduct
Although the Model Rules are often ambiguous in defining the
role of child's counsel, the best-interest model of advocacy may not
comport with fundamental principles, such as client autonomy, em-
bedded within the rules. Most significantly, the Model Rules explicitly
recognize that very young or very old clients may have reasoned opin-
ions that are due fair weight in legal proceedings. As recognized in
the Commentary to Rule 1.14, often "children as young as five or six,
and certainly those of ten or twelve" have the "ability to understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting
[their] own well-being.' 182 If the client has identifiable values and
goals, understands the consequences of her choices, and can provide
reasons for selecting among competing options, then the client is suf-
ficiently capable of directing the attorney and the client's decision
should be honored. 83 Unfortunately, best-interest advocates all too
180 SeeJuan Ramirez Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville's Tribute to
the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 103, 120-21 (2004) (individuals who perceive
the justice system as unfair "are less likely to accept judicial decisions"); cf COCHRAN
ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-3(a), at 115 (stating that attorneys who build personal
relationships with clients may enjoy greater success in counseling clients than those
who employ coercive tactics); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an
Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1330-31 (2000) ("[I]n civil commitment
context, evidence suggests that allowing an adolescent to direct his or her own care
enhances the effect of therapy .... ); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Speaking for a Child: The Role
of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 685 (1987) (quoting Guggen-
heim, supra note 8, at 78) (arguing that it is unfair to obligate a child to take responsi-
bility for his actions while at the same time deprive him of the ability to direct counsel
in his own defense).
181 Lyon, supra note 180, at 686; Ronner, supra note 177, at 93.
182 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 6 (2003) (identifying factors
attorney should consider in evaluating client's capacity).
183 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996);
Bray & Ensley, supra note 138, at 336; David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession,
1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 455-57; Maurer &Johnson, supra note 147, at 1-14 (stating that
attorneys should "[u]se a non-circular method to assess capacity. It is not enough to
consider whether the client's decisions are unwise but, rather, whether the client can
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often rely on circular, self-serving reasoning to find a client impaired
simply because he or she disagrees with or finds a client's decision
unreasonable or unwise. 184 Instead of looking for evidence of rea-
soned or considered judgment by the client, the advocate uses the
capacity construct as a means by which he can end-run around the
preference for a normal attorney-client relationship. 18 5
Recent revisions to the commentary of Rule 1.14 also suggest that
an attorney should take protective action on behalf of the client only
in limited circumstances and should pursue any protective action with
a preference for the least intrusive alternative. The Ethics 2000 Com-
mission, for example, placed an additional limitation on attorney in-
terference by limiting protective action to those circumstances in
which the client is "at risk of substantial physical, financial or other
harm." 18 6 Considering that the judge will retain control over all final
decisions in a delinquency case after hearing from the prosecutor and
the probation officer, the risk of substantial harm to the best-interests
of the child is not significantly increased by allowing the child to di-
rect the course of his legal representation. The Commission also indi-
cated that an attorney should refrain from the "extreme measure" of
seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem unless and until other
less restrictive measures, such as consulting with family members and
delaying action to give the client a period of reconsideration, have
failed.18 7 The revisions also removed language that previously sug-
gested that an attorney might serve as a "de facto guardian" for the
give reasons for specific decisions and understand the consequences."); Rein, supra
note 139, at 1141.
184 See Maurer & Johnson, supra note 147, at 1-14 (advising lawyers to avoid
"usurp [ing] the client's decision-making authority" by coercing the client to acquiesce
in the lawyer's decisions); cf Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l &
Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 1997-2 (1997) (holding that lawyer may make disclosure with-
out child client's consent if client is unable to make a reasoned decision); Bray &
Ensley, supra note 138, at 333 n.20 (1999) (noting that "highly irrational acts" of ad-
verse adult clients in a divorce case do not mean that the litigants are incompetent);
Luban, supra note 183, at 466 (arguing that attorneys should not use self-justifying,
circular logic when determining that a person is unable to make rational decisions).
185 See Rein, supra note 139, at 1118 (arguing that it would be more humanizing
for an attorney to advise a client that she cannot do something because it will hurt
others, than to allow the attorney to declare a client incompetent to achieve the same
goal).
186 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) and cmt. 5; see also ETHICS 2000
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (stating that in taking protective ac-
tion, a lawyer should consider the wishes and values of the client and avoid intruding
into a client's autonomy to the extent feasible).
187 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmts. 5, 7; see also ETHICS 2000
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmts. 5, 7 (stating that a lawyer should con-
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client and now implicitly acknowledge important distinctions between
the attorney for the child and the guardian ad litem.188 In the new
commentary, it is the guardian ad litem-and not the attorney-who
should serve as surrogate decisionmaker when the client's capacity is
so diminished as to warrant intervention.18 9 The rule never considers
it appropriate for the lawyer to abandon his loyalty to the client and
assume the role of best-interest guardian.
c. Best-Interest Model Fails To Protect Fundamental Rights of
Juvenile at Adjudicatory and Disposition Phases
The paternalism of best-interest advocacy is probably most dis-
turbing when it denies children fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. As revealed in a number of the state assessments on the
access to and quality of juvenile counsel, attorneys who adhere to the
best-interest model often give very little attention to challenging the
government's case, conduct little or no investigation, and frequently
rely on probation officers as the primary source of information about
the client and the charges. 190 An attorney who believes that juvenile
court intervention is best for the child may refuse to fight or be lacka-
daisical in fighting allegations of delinquency-even if he or she
sider the consistency of a decision with the known commitments and values of the
client).
188 See ETHICS 2000 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmts. 5, 7 (comparing
the 2000 revised rules with the former rules). Rule 1.14 comment 7 recognizes that
appointment of a guardian is often expensive and traumatic for the client and en-
courages the attorney to weigh competing financial and emotional costs against the
need for the guardian.
189 MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (stating that the lawyer
should look to the client's legal representative or guardian for decisions on behalf of
the client); see also ETHiCS 2000 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (com-
paring the 2000 revised rules with the former rules).
190 See KENTUCKY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 32 (noting that, due to a "best-
interests" approach taken by many juvenile defenders in one jurisdiction, there is very
little motion practice or trial preparation, and very few trials are held); MONTANA
ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 40 (stating that in adopting a "best-interests" approach,
juvenile defenders revealed their reliance on probation officers to "help the kids," as
well as a belief by others in the system that to protect a child's best-interests, a de-
fender should "get along with everyone"); OHIO ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 26
("best-interests" approach taken by juvenile defender resulted in the defender reiter-
ating the negative comments by a probation officer about the juvenile during a hear-
ing, and the defender advocating that the juvenile be "incarcerated for treatment
purposes"); TEXAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 14 (at the disposition stage, very few
defenders present additional evidence, relying on the recommendations of the proba-
tion officers, partly because the defenders believe that the probation officers know
best what is appropriate for the child).
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knows the client is innocent.191 The best-interest advocate may also
freely disregard the attorney-client privilege and/or ignore the child's
right against self-incrimination in order to ensure that the child gets
the treatment the attorney thinks he needs. 192 In some cases, the at-
torney may actually help the government try their case against the
child, choose not to object at trial to otherwise excludable evi-
dence, 19 3 and render the child's right to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt virtually meaningless. 194 In negotiating pleas, defense attorneys
might also ignore clear Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. 19 5 At
disposition, the attorney might defer to the judge and probation of-
ficer for a determination of what is in the client's best-interest, 9 6 or in
some instances, actually request more restrictive or longer periods of
confinement when they believe such penalties are appropriate. 197
The best-interest model is difficult to justify in the face of substan-
tive and procedural due process guaranteed to children in the juve-
nile justice system. Despite its many ambiguities and continued
endorsement of the benefits of juvenile court, the Supreme Court
made clear that rehabilitation would not be offered at the expense of
due process. 98 Not only did the Court guarantee the accused child
the right to counsel, but the Court also guaranteed the child the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right against self-incrimi-
nation, and the right to notice of charges against him. 99 These rights
would be meaningless if the child were denied the power to direct the
course of his representation and his rights were asserted or waived at
the whim of an attorney.200 Although the judge retains the ultimate
responsibility to protect and enforce the rights of children, if the at-
torney decides on his own not to litigate those rights, then the sub-
191 See Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1411.
192 Ferster et al., supra note 17, at 388-89 (nonadversary lawyer may want to reveal
his or her belief in the client's guilt in order to assure the benefits of rehabilitation);
Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1412.
193 Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1413; Platt & Friedman, supra note 24, at 1179.
194 See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 81, 86-87.
195 Ferster et al., supra note 17, at 388 (discussing attorneys' practice of reporting
any juvenile admission to the court); GEORGIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 24; see
also Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1412-13 (discussing whether an attorney should
use exclusionary tactics in juvenile justice).
196 GEORGIA ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 31 (quoting Georgia defense attorney as
saying: "Disposition hearings are really conducted between probation and the judge.
My input as the defense attorney is not required.").
197 See Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 1127.
198 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1967).
199 Id. at 31-57.
200 Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 86.
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stantive and procedural safeguards are waived without input from
either the child or the judge.20 1
By allowing attorneys to advocate in the best-interest of the child,
the system merely substitutes the unbridled discretion of the court for
the unbridled discretion of counsel. 20 2 In Gault, the Court noted that
the "unbridled discretion [of the court], however benevolently moti-
vated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."20 3
As a number of commentators have noted, application of the best-
interest standard by judges has been indeterminate at best and vulner-
able to bias and abuse at worst. 20 4 Because attorneys are subject to the
same racial, cultural, and class biases as judges, there is little reason to
believe that attorneys will be in any better position than judges to as-
sess the best-interest of the child.20 5 The unbridled discretion of
counsel may be more troubling than that of the judge considering
that the attorney's conduct in juvenile cases is rarely, if ever, subject to
appellate review. 20 6
201 Id. at 86-87 (noting the argument that the best-interest standard usurps role of
the judge).
202 See id. at 87; Maurer & Johnson, supra note 147, at 1-16.
203 387 U.S. at 18.
204 See Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recom-
mendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2001) (criticizing the best-interests
model as unpredictable and vulnerable to bias); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity,
Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 11, 53-56,
62-63 (1994) (arguing that inherent biases preventjudges from objectively or consist-
ently applying the best-interest test); Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Aban-
doning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 449, 463-64 ("[E]xperience shows that best-interests standard is
indeterminate and very difficult to apply."); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and
Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215,
2220-23 (1991) (quoting David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Cus-
tody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984)) (noting that critics of the
best-interests standard as applied by judges find such an approach to be inherently
indeterminate and can be "arbitrary or overreaching" as well).
205 See Andrew Hoffman, The Role of Child's Counsel in State Intervention Proceedings:
Toward a Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Family Reunification, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
326, 336 (Spring 2004) ("The notion that attorneys can objectively conclude what
serves a child's best interests is preposterous. Attorneys are no more inherently objec-
tive than anyone else." Hoffman goes on to argue that the determination of what is in
the best-interest of the child should be left to judges and challenged through the
appellate process.); Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in
Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 345, 376-78 (1997) (arguing
that clinical students' unconscious racial bias affects the attorney-client relationship).
206 Berkheiser, supra note 68, at 633; see Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in
Texas-It's a Crime! Or Should Be, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 21 (1999) (noting that a review
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Even where the Court in Gault continued to affirm differences
between adult and juvenile proceedings and refused a wholesale in-
corporation of the Sixth Amendment and other Bill of Rights provi-
sions into the juvenile case, 20 7 the Court remained unequivocal in its
mandate that the hearings must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment. 20 8 The Court's commitment to fundamen-
tal fairness suggests that an accused child has the same interest in fair
and accurate fact-finding as the accused adult in a criminal case. 20 9
Because the adversarial model has been repeatedly recognized as an
essential and indispensable feature of fair and accurate fact-finding, 210
a juvenile system that permits the child's advocate to forego his alli-
ance with the client is troubling. As the Supreme Court indicated in
the adult criminal context, society is better served when the lawyer is
advancing the interests of the client, rather than joining together and
acting in concert with society.2 11 When a criminal case loses its char-
ofjuvenile appeals by the Texas Court of Criminal appeals turned up only eight cases
from 1980-1997).
207 387 U.S. at 22. Although the Court did find that due process necessarily re-
quires some "degree of order and regularity" and some "elements of the adversary
system," id. at 27, other more benign features such as the processing ofjuveniles sepa-
rately from adults, decisions not to classify children as "criminals," decisions not to
treat delinquency as a basis of civil disability and policies protecting the confidential-
ity ofjuvenile court proceedings do not implicate traditional notions of fundamental
fairness and due process and can be granted or denied at the discretion of state legis-
lators. Id. at 22-25.
208 Id. at 30.
209 Id. at 36; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) ("The Court's con-
cern for the vulnerability of children is demonstrated in its decisions dealing with
minors' claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or property
interests by the State. With respect to many of these claims, we have concluded that
the child's right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example, the Court
has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of lib-
erty without due process of law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings."); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (finding no material difference
between adult criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings when considering the
child's need for assistance of counsel).
210 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that legal system requires public defenders to
advance the best undivided interests of clients rather than acting on behalf of or in
concert with the state).
211 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318-19; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
655 (1984) ("' [P]artisan advocacy on both sides of the case best promotes the ulti-
mate objectives that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.'") (quoting
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
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acter as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guar-
antee of a fair trial is violated. 212
The Court in Gault also referenced key adult right to counsel
cases in foreclosing any notion that a judge can represent or protect
the interests of a juvenile defendant.213 Because neither the proba-
tion officer nor the judge owes any undivided loyalty to the client,
neither can fairly represent the views and interests of the minor.214
The Court was particularly concerned about probation officers who
may also serve as arresting officers, file and verify petitions of delin-
quency, and testify against the child. 215 The Court's language and re-
liance on key principles of criminal law and procedure suggest that a
best-interest model that deviates so starkly from the adversarial model
in adult cases cannot be the appropriate role of counsel in juvenile
cases. When counsel acts in the best-interest of the child, counsel's
function is barely distinguishable from that of the fact-finder, the pro-
bation officer and sometimes even the prosecutor. Gault seems oddly
unnecessary if the right to counsel as articulated in that case was
merely duplicative of protections that already existed when the case
was decided.
Although arguments for best-interest advocacy generally remain
strongest at the disposition hearing where the parties are particularly
focused on treatment over punishment and retribution, there is little
justification for a nonadversarial best-interest model in jurisdictions
where treatment is a myth. 216 Considering the Court's concern as
early as 1966, that children may not be getting the treatment prom-
ised them in the juvenile justice system, 217 along with current evi-
212 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57.
213 387 U.S. at 36 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
214 Id. at 35-36.
215 Id. (discussing the role of probation officers in Arizona where Gerald Gault
was tried).
216 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treat-
ment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 892 (1988) (evaluating juvenile
justice system since Gault and noting "the continuing gap between the rhetoric of
rehabilitation and its punitive reality"); Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1414, 1416,
1420; Karen L. Michaelis, School Violence: The Call for a Critical Theory ofjuvenile Justice,
2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 299, 311 (discussing the failure of the juvenile justice system to
provide protection and rehabilitation to juvenile offenders); Jonathan Simon, Power
Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDozo L. REV. 1363,
1364-65 (1995) (noting that the juvenile justice system's "official premise of rehabili-
tation is openly ridiculed in the media and in the discourse of professional
politicians").
217 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) ("There is evidence ... that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
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dence of the deplorable conditions in many detention and treatment
facilities across the country,21 8 traditional notions of liberty and funda-
mental fairness remain paramount at disposition. When the treat-
ment facilities are inadequate and even harmful, disposition is the
stage where the child's liberty is most significantly in jeopardy and
becomes the most important phase in the entire process.21 9
Even where treatment is available and adequate, thorough and
accurate fact-finding is no less important at the disposition phase than
at other stages of the case. Not only are children entitled to a number
of statutory procedural safeguards at disposition, but the child's con-
stitutional rights to due process and fundamental fairness also persist
at this stage. Children have a right to probe the accuracy, thorough-
ness, and reliability of probation reports prepared for disposition, 220
and in some states, children retain a statutory right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses at the disposition hearing.22 1 Thus even as
rehabilitation remains the primary goal of disposition, the attorney
has a continuing duty to consult with the client in the exercise or
waiver of substantive rights conferred by legislatures and the courts.
Effective rehabilitation also requires individualized planning on
behalf of each child.2 22 Because the needs of every child will differ,
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.").
218 For a representative sample, Human Rights Watch has published reports docu-
menting the poor conditions of juvenile detention facilities in Colorado, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HIGH COUNTY LOCKUP: CHILDREN IN CONFINEMENT IN COLORADO
(1997), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/usacol/, Georgia, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, MODERN CAPITAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS? ABUSES IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA
(1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Us.htm, and Maryland,
HUMAN RGHTS WATCH, No MINOR MATTER: CHILDREN IN MARYLAND'S JAILS (1999),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/Maryland-03.htm/. Am-
nesty International has published a report about dangerousness and overcrowding in
U.S. juvenile detention facilities. AMNESTY INT'L, BETRAYING THE YOUNG: HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE US JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR510601998ENGLISH/$File/AMR5106098.
pdf.
219 See State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 412 (W. Va. 1980); STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES 3.1(a), 9.4(a) (IJA-ABA Joint
Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Standards 1979).
220 STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES 9.4.
221 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110(a) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 46b-135(a)
(West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-7 (2005); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5(g)
(West Supp. 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6338(a) (West 2000); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-127(a) (2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b) (Vernon 2002); W. VA. CODE.
ANN. § 49-5-2(i) (LexisNexis 2004); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 938.21(a) (West Supp. 2004).
222 Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's "Juvenile In-
justice System, "22 PEPP. L. REv. 907, 909 (1995).
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not every treatment program will be appropriate for every child. Yet
judges who are consciously and/or subconsciously influenced by
budgetary constraints may reject a better treatment plan in favor of
one that fits nicely into the existing state or local juvenile justice
budget. Ultimately, the disposition decision is no less susceptible to
the arbitrariness of the judge or probation officer than is the trial ver-
dict or other evidentiary ruling. Where there is any risk of arbitrary
decisionmaking, children need the protection of a diligent and loyal
advocate who will insist upon substantive and procedural regularities,
ensure accurate fact-finding and expand the range of treatment op-
tions the judge may consider. Because best-interest advocacy too
often ignores the child's right to exercise or waive fundamental rights
at adjudication or disposition, it does not appear to be a satisfactory
option for the attorney-child paradigm in delinquency cases.
B. Parent-Directed Best-Interest Advocacy
1. Rationale/Justification
The value an advocate places on the rights and responsibilities of
parents will factor heavily into how the attorney defines his or her role
in the representation of children. Given the fairly strong legal and
social history of parental control over almost every facet of a child's
life,22 3 along with traditional assumptions that parents are naturally
inclined to act in the best-interest of their child, the law is generally
reluctant to impede the rights of parents to raise and direct their chil-
dren.224 In some areas of the law, parents may even have a constitu-
tional right to direct and decide for the child. 225 In turn, some
objections to zealous, client-directed advocacy in delinquency cases
may arise out of the advocate's endorsement of the parents' rights or
deference to the parents' goals at the adjudicatory and disposition
phases.
223 Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 589, 594 (2002) (the parental right to control one's child has been recognized
by the Supreme Court "as part of the substantive due process rights of Americans.");
Hafen, supra note 82, at 427; Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1422.
224 Guggenheim, supra note 223, at 593-94; Hafen, supra note 82, at 427; Kay &
Segal, supra note 12, at 1422; Scott, supra note 82, at 551.
225 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); see alsoJohn E.
Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, 1 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 495,
502-03 (1985) (arguing that a child's nature necessitates that some "adult regime"
will direct his or her life, whether it be parents, the state, or both); Hafen, supra note
82, at 439 (arguing that parents have a constitutional right to make decisions for their
children, but this right falls to the state if the courts find the parents unfit).
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The debate over the role of parents and children in delinquency
cases must be seen as a subpart of the larger "competition" between
the rights of children and the rights of parents in society. 226 On one
side of the debate, "Children's Liberation" activists endorse greater
decisionmaking autonomy for children, presume decisionmaking ca-
pacity of all verbal children and acknowledge the child's right to di-
rect counsel in all types of legal proceedings. 227 On the other side of
the debate, parents'-rights advocates reject both a best-interest model
of advocacy that would allow the attorney to determine the course of
the representation as well as a client-directed model that would allow
the child to direct the representation. 2 8 According to these advo-
cates, both models threaten the parents' constitutional right to raise
their children absent any judicial or administrative finding that they
are unfit.2 29 Attorneys who identify with parents' rights activists may
favor a parent-directed model of representation that seeks to preserve
the authority of parents within the family.
The Supreme Court seemed to resurrect the old custodial view of
children in 1984 and thereby refueled the early post- Gault confusion
when it said in Schall v. Martin2 30 that
unlike adults, [children] are always in some form of custody....
Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take
care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of
their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its
part as parens patiae.23 I
Relying on this language some might now rationalize best-interest ad-
vocacy with an argument that the Supreme Court has never viewed
children as legally competent and autonomous persons in delin-
quency cases.2 32 That is, because the child is legally incompetent and
always subject to the direction of a parent or other adult guardian, the
child should never be allowed to direct the course of representation.
Ironically, the Court's language in Schall appears to conflict with the
Court's effort in Gault to abandon the antiquated parens patriae doc-
trine as an excuse to deprive an accused child of the essential ele-
226 See Moore, supra note 80, at 1826-27.
227 Hafen, supra note 82, at 433-35, 440-41.
228 Id. at 447, 458-61.
229 Id. at 447, 458-59. Hafen cites Pierce for the proposition that parents enjoy a
constitutional right to raise children as they see fit so long as their conduct in relation
to the child does not fall below a minimal threshold of unfitness. Id. at 445-46.
230 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
231 Id. at 265 (citations omitted) (discussing validity of a preventitive detention
statute in New York).
232 See discussion in Mlyniec, supra note 8, at 107-08.
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ments of fundamental fairness and due process in delinquency
proceedings.233 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's language in Schall,
as in Gault, may generate more confusion than clarity and provide
support for arguments in favor of parent-directed advocacy on behalf
of children.
Although never explicitly labeled in the literature, there appears
to be a strand of best-interest advocacy that relies heavily on parental
determinations of the child's best-interest. 234 Like the traditional
best-interest model, a parent-directed model presumes the child is ei-
ther incapable of making decisions regarding his case or unwise in
making those decisions. 23 5 However, unlike the traditional best-inter-
est model, the parent-directed model looks to the parent, not the at-
torney, as the alternative adult decisionmaker. Thus, the parent-
directed model is particularly attractive to the attorney who questions
his or her own ability to decide what's best for the child. The attorney
communicates primarily with the parent, gathering information about
the child's needs, providing information about options in the case,
and advising the parent on a recommended course of action. Key
decisions are then left to the parent who presumptively understands
and appreciates the child's unique psychosocial makeup and context
within his family, culture and community. Not only is the parent a
rational decisionmaker who can identify and weigh all of the potential
short- and long-term consequences of any given decision, but the par-
ent also has special insight into the needs of the child and the family.
By communicating with the parent, the attorney also saves time
and circumvents difficulties that may arise out of the child's poor
communication skills, limited cognitive ability and lack of trust for
adults. Presuming the child will have a better relationship with his par-
ent than with the unknown attorney, the attorney is less concerned
about establishing an independent relationship with the child and in-
stead funnels information and questions through the parent.
Parent-directed advocacy also encourages the active participation
of parents in the juvenile justice process and galvanizes the parents'
support and commitment to the court's final rehabilitation alterna-
233 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1967).
234 Although Jonathan Hafen does not use the term "parent-directed advocacy,"
he does use the phrase "parental discretion model" and clearly advocates for an
amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that would assure parents
the right to direct the child's counsel in any legal matter unless the parent is deter-
mined to be unfit by a finding such as neglect, abuse or abandonment of the child.
Hafen, supra note 82, at 440; see GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 7.
235 Hafen, supra note 82, at 424, 438-39.
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tive. 23 6 As the primary source of discipline and structure, the parents'
input and cooperation will be necessary for the successful implemen-
tation of any disposition plan. 23 7 Parents who feel engaged in the pro-
cess will be more likely to assist, while parents who feel excluded from
the attorney-client relationship may refuse to help either the attorney,
the child or the court in the rehabilitative process. 23 8 Parental in-
volvement may also serve as a check on the competence and effective-
ness of counsel.
2. Limitations of Parent-Directed Advocacy
Notwithstanding the benefits of parental involvement in the juve-
nile justice system, deference to parental goals may not always be ap-
propriate in a delinquency case. The parent-directed model is rooted
in a number of assumptions about the relationship between parents
and children that simply may not hold true in the delinquency con-
text. In particular, the model assumes that parents have a conflict-free
desire to act in the child's best-interest; that parents are more compe-
tent than either the child or the child's attorney to determine the
best-interests of the child in the legal context; and that parents have a
sufficient understanding of the short- and long-term legal conse-
quences of a selected course of action.
At the inception of the juvenile court movement, court innova-
tors justified state interference in the sanctity of the family on a doc-
trine of parens patriae, which literally means "parent of the country."23 9
Because parents of delinquent children were deemed derelict in their
duty to discipline and supervise the child, they forfeited their right to
make decisions on the child's behalf and thus consented by default to
236 See id. at 427 (arguing that "ensuring participation of deserving parents in the
decision-making process of the attorney representing the child ... will protect soci-
ety's interest in familial stability").
237 See Gilbert et al., supra note 24, at 1155-56 (explaining importance of family in
achieving juvenile justice goals); Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access to
Juvenile Justice: Should Freedom of the Press Be Limited To Promote Rehabilitation of Youthful
Offenders?, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1897, 1904 (1995) (noting that a "strong family relation-
ship is essential to successful rehabilitation").
238 See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 204, at 483-84 (discussing fear that denial of
parental rights may "have the long-term effect of reducing parental commitment to
childrearing"); Scott, supra note 82, at 551 (recognizing that parental rights and au-
thority might be viewed as legal compensation for the burden of responsibility to
provide food, shelter, health care, affection and education).
239 Tanenhaus, supra note 13, at 46; see also Wong, supra note 124, at 166 (noting
that the doctrine of parens patriae gave the State the "power and responsibility" to
watch over children whose parents were not providing "appropriate care or
supervision").
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the state's intervention. 240 Both historically and today, parents often
directly or indirectly contribute to the child's delinquent conduct.
Family conflict, domestic violence, the absence of parental attachment
or ties, parents' mental instability, and the lack of parental supervision
or discipline are all factors that contribute to delinquency. 241 In these
circumstances, the parents may not be any better equipped than the
attorney to make decisions regarding the needs and best-interests of
the child.
Parental direction may be equally inappropriate when the inter-
ests of the parent conflict with the welfare of the child.24 2 The Su-
preme Court's intended or unintended attention to the rights of
parents in the dicta of In re Gault was offered in a factual context that
presented no conflict of interest between Gerald Gault and his par-
ents. 243 Unfortunately, juvenile advocates cannot always presume a
conflict-free relationship in the delinquency case. 244 In some cases, a
formal conflict may exist where the parent is either the cause of the
delinquent conduct or the victim of the allegation. 2 45 In other cases,
a parent may argue for the child's detention simply because he or she
needs a break from parental custody and responsibility. 246 The parent
may also be embarrassed by the child's conduct, resent losing time
240 Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 113, 116; Wong, supra note 124, at 166.
241 See Gilbert et al., supra note 24, at 1170, 1174; Marrus, supra note 8, at 323-24
(parents' conduct and mental health may be a factor in delinquency); George Bundy
Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, The Judicial Role in the Treatment ofJuvenie Delinquents, 3 J.L.
& POL'Y 347, 366-67 (1995).
242 Even parental rights advocates would agree that parental direction of the
child's legal representation would be inappropriate when "interests of the parents
conflict with those of the child." Hafen, supra note 82, at 461-62.
243 In Gault, both Gerald and his parents wanted Gerald to return home, as evi-
denced by the parents' appearances before the court and the effort by the parents on
Gerald's behalf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1967).
244 SeeJanet Fink, Who Decides: The Role of Parent or Guardian in Juvenile Delinquency
Representation, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 105, 123
(RodneyJ. Uphoff ed., 1995). Children's Liberation activists have rejected a categori-
cal presumption of shared interests between the parent and the child. See Hafen,
supra note 82, at 440-41; David R. Katner, Raising Mental Health Issues-Other than
Insanity-In Juvenile Delinquency Defense, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, 78 (2000) (discussing
the potential for conflicts of interest between parents and children); see also United
States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1973) (father's concern was with
whether his son's trouble would prevent the father from getting into the "Job
Corps"); Anglin v. State, 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (juvenile defendant
confessed after his mother told him to "tell the truth" or she would "clobber" him).
245 See, e.g., K.E.S. v. State, 216 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Kell, supra note
115, at 359-61; Moore, supra note 80, at 1851-52.
246 See Lyon, supra note 180, at 686.
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from work to attend court-related proceedings, or fear the loss of pub-
lic housing if the child is released back into the home.247 The poten-
tial for conflicts of interest between the parent and the child is even
greater in those jurisdictions where the parent may be held civilly,
criminally, or financially liable for the child's delinquent conduct;
where the parent may be held in contempt for the child's failure to
comply with the conditions of probation; or where parental participa-
tion statutes compel the parent's cooperation and subject them to
sanctions for their own noncompliance.2 48 Although not every issue
will rise to a formal conflict of interest, even subtle differences in per-
spective may lead to divergent goals between the accused child and his
parent.249
Parental control over the child's attorney may also violate state
statutes and common law that affirm the child's right to conflict-free
representation. A number of state legislatures, for example, have rec-
ognized the potential for parent-child conflicts in right-to-counsel stat-
utes. In states where parents have their own right to counsel in
delinquency proceedings, relevant statutes often require the courts to
appoint separate and independent counsel for both the child and the
parent when there is any evidence of conflicting interest.250 In addi-
tion, many statutes expressly require the court to appoint counsel for
a child whose parents are deemed financially able to provide counsel,
but who refuse to do so. 25 1 Several state courts have also held that a
parent may not waive the child's right to counsel when the parent has
247 See In reManuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 725-26 (Conn. 1988); Kristin Henning, Erod-
ing Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities
Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 573-74 (2004); Fink, supra note 244, at 123; see also
Stanley Z. Fisher, Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS ANNOTATED 243, § 5.3, at 254 (Robert E. Shepherd Jr. ed., 1996).
248 For a sampling of state statutes that subject parents to fines, incarceration, or
other sanctions for the child's delinquent conduct or the child's failure to comply
with conditions of the court, see ALA. CODE § 12-15-11.1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-5 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.041 (Vernon 2002 & Supp.
2004-2005); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-244 (2005). For a sampling of state statutes that
compel, with the threat of sanctions, parental attendance and participation in court
hearings, counseling, and other juvenile justice services see Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
308 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2325.01 (LexisNexis 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-
520 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-37-9-4 (LexisNexis 2003); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
307 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1412 (2003).
249 See Moore, supra note 80, at 1840.
250 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-514; 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 405/5-610 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-324-2; IOWA CODE § 232.11
(2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6337 (2004).
251 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.203 (West
Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-514; NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272 (2004); TENN.
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interests that conflict with that of the child.25 2 Similarly, the fact that
a child is accompanied by a parent in a delinquency proceeding may
not relieve the court of its responsibility to inquire directly of the child
and to determine whether the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. 253
The right to conflict-free representation in juvenile cases has
been further endorsed by the ABA. As stated in the IJA-ABA
Standards,
[a]ll parties should be informed by the initial attorney that he or
she is counsel for the juvenile, and that in the event of disagree-
ment between a parent or guardian and the juvenile, the attorney is
required to serve exclusively the interests of the accused juvenile. 25 4
The potential for conflict of interest between an accused juvenile
and his or her parents should be clearly recognized and acknowl-
edged. In every case, doubt as to a conflict should be resolved by
the appointment of separate counsel for the child and by advising
parents of their right to counsel .... 255
Even where there is no conflict between the parent and the child,
parents may not be the best decisionmakers in the delinquency con-
text where they generally lack the legal knowledge and expertise to
navigate the juvenile justice system. Parents' opinions, for example,
are often based on a misguided and exaggerated view of what the juve-
nile justice system is able to accomplish. 256 The parents may force or
encourage the child to plead guilty so he can get treatment and ser-
vices without seeing the label "treatment facility" as a euphemism for
juvenile jail. Likewise, the parent may support confession as good for
the child's moral redemption, but fail to recognize the dangers of re-
CODE ANN. § 37-1-126 (2004). In these states, the courts will generally appoint coun-
sel and then hold the parent in contempt for failing to pay legal fees.
252 See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1973); Manuel
R, 543 A.2d at 726; In re C.P.D, 367 A.2d 133, 134-35 (D.C. 1976); see also 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6337 ("[A] parent, guardian or custodian may not waive counsel for a
child when their interest may be in conflict with the interest or interests of the
child.").
253 Manuel R, 543 A.2d at 725.
254 STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS 8.1 (IJA-ABAJoint Comm'n on juve-
nile justice Standards 1979).
255 Id.
256 In my own experience as a juvenile defender in the District of Columbia over
the last ten years, parents often seek police or court intervention to get mental health
services, drug treatment, or general supervision for unruly children. These parents
frequently report disappointment in their own loss of control over the direction of
rehabilitation, the lack of services in the system, and the child's negative response to
poorly planned treatment and intervention.
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lying on the juvenile justice system as a forum through which to instill
values and moral upbringing. Parents rarely understand that many
juvenile institutions simply help children refine delinquent behavior
and expose incarcerated youth to physical and/or mental abuse2 57
In addition, attorneys who defer to the views of the parent with-
out consulting with the child will miss critical insight about the child
and the facts and circumstances of the charged offense. If the parent
is excluded from the attorney-child relationship, the parent generally
retains the right to address the court directly or indirectly through
probation officers and other court officials. 258 By contrast, when the
child is denied meaningful participation in the attorney-client rela-
tionship, his voice is essentially excluded from the juvenile justice sys-
tem as a whole. An attorney-parent dyad that excludes the child may
also deny the child's right to exercise or waive the fundamental rights
conferred by Gault and is likely to engender the same resentment
from the child as the traditional best-interest model. The child may
very well rebel against a rehabilitation plan developed by the attorney,
the parent, and the court without his input.259
Interpreting the right to counsel in a delinquency case as the par-
ents' right or even as a parent-directed right may also run contrary to
the dictates of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Collectively,
the Model Rules envision a "normal" attorney-client relationship that
is driven by prompt and reasonable communication with the client
(Rules 1.4 and 2.1), the protection of client confidences (Rule 1.6),
and freedom from conflicts of interest (Rules 1.7-.12).260 Not only
may parental control violate rules regarding conflicts, but parental
participation in the attorney-child communication may also waive any
attorney-client privilege and result in the parent being called as a wit-
ness for the state against the child. 261 The rules also do not permit
257 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
258 In many jurisdictions, the parent will be recognized as a formal party to the
delinquency case. See supra notes 38 and 248.
259 See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 44-45 (1999) (claiming that the efficacy of court-
ordered treatment may be impaired if the individual feels that his or her input is not
being taken into consideration during legal proceedings).
260 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4, 1.6, 1.7-.12, 2.1 (2003); see also, e.g.,
N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Ethics Op. 18 (1999) (holding that attorney for minor in
criminal case owes duty of confidentiality to the minor and may only disclose confi-
dential information to the minor's parent with the consent of minor or if the parent is
the legal guardian and disclosure is necessary to make a legally binding decision).
261 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). But see the new Commentary
for Model Rule 1.14 that suggests that the attorney-client privilege may survive if the
client of diminished capacity asks the attorney to consult with his parents. Several
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the best-interest advocate to consult with parents in lieu of the client.
Rules 1.4 and 2.1 require the attorney to keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of his or her case and to explain issues to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions. Even where the client's capacity is so diminished that a
guardian is appointed, the attorney should continue to communicate
with the client as far as reasonably possible. 262
Interesting ethical questions also arise when the parent volunta-
rily hires an attorney for an accused child or when the court appoints
an attorney but orders the parent to compensate the attorney for his
services. Parents who pay for the attorney will generally expect to con-
trol or at least participate in decisions regarding the course of repre-
sentation. Model Rule 1.8(f), however, explicitly addresses this
situation and clearly prohibits third party interference in the attorney-
client relationship. 263 Not only does the attorney owe continuing loy-
alty to the client and not the third party payee, but the attorney also
may not violate client's confidences by communicating with the
payee. 264
The rejection of a parent-directed model of advocacy does not
mean that parents cannot or should not assist in the attorney-child
relationship. Parental involvement may serve as a check on attorney
competence, help the child understand difficult legal issues and
bridge trust between the child and the attorney. Unfortunately, too
many advocates miss the distinction between parental control and pa-
rental assistance. When the advocate is overly deferential to the par-
ents and careless about confidentiality constraints, he effectively
states have formally extended the attorney-client privilege to include parents who are
invited to assist the child. See also, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.
1984) (noting attorney-client privilege is generally waived when a third party is pre-
sent, but finding that parents' presence did not waive privilege when parent was there
as advisor and parties intended communications to remain confidential); United
States v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1972) (same); State v. Sucharew, 66 P.3d 59 (Az.
Ct. App. 2003) (same); see alsoWASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 2005) ("[A]
parent or guardian of a minor child arrested on a criminal charge may not be ex-
amined as to communication between the child and his or her attorney if the commu-
nication was made in the presence of the parent or guardian."). However, even
where the client of diminished capacity invites a family member to participate in dis-
cussions with the attorney, the lawyer must look to the client and not to family mem-
bers to make decisions in the case. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3;
see also ETHICS 2000 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 153, R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (stating that a
lawyer must look to his client, and not family members, in making decisions on the
client's behalf).
262 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 2.
263 Id. R. 1.8(f).
264 See id. R. 1.8(f)(3); Moore, supra note 80, at 1845-47.
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denies the child's individual right to counsel and may impede the re-
habilitative process by alienating the child and developing an incom-
plete picture of the child's needs.
C. Substituted Judgment Doctrine
1. Rationale/Justification
Notwithstanding the Model Rules' preference for a normal attor-
ney-client relationship and rejection of broad generalizations about
the capacity of children, there are times when a client's capacity will
be so diminished as to completely hinder communication and render
a normal attorney-client relationship impossible. In those cases, the
attorney will face a difficult challenge-that of maintaining loyalty to
the client and of satisfying the very real goals of the legal representa-
tion. In some cases, the doctrine of substituted judgment may provide
a viable solution to this challenge. Under this doctrine, an attorney
will make decisions on behalf of an incompetent client based on what
the client would decide if he or she were competent.265
The doctrine has a number of advantages over both the tradi-
tional and parent-directed best-interest models. 266 The substituted
judgment doctrine differs from best-interest advocacy primarily in its
attempt to honor client loyalty and dignity and in its efforts to repli-
cate the child's wishes to the greatest extent possible.267 Substituted
judgment focuses the advocate's attention on the child's perspective
and purports to be less vulnerable to the influence of the attorney's
own personal and subjective opinion of what is best for the child.268
The doctrine guides and limits the attorney's discretion by requiring
the attorney to gather information about the client's pattern of
choices in similar circumstances and/or to assess what other reasona-
265 Jessica Litman, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutional-
ized Mentally II 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1720, 1722-23 (1982).
266 The substituted judgment doctrine may also have advantages over the appoint-
ment of a guardian to serve as surrogate decisionmaker and direct counsel. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 7. While appointment of a guardian
may preserve the appearance of attorney loyalty, that loyalty exists in name only when
the attorney merely defers to the decisions of the guardian.
267 See Angela D. Lurie, Representing the Child-Client: Kids Are People Too, 11 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. Hum. RTs. 205, 235 (1993) (noting that when implemented properly, substi-
tuted judgment model allows attorney to advocate what the child would want if ma-
ture); Lyon, supra note 180, at 702; Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of
Whether Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings Should Be Represented by Lawyers, 32
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 65-67 (2000) (recognizing that substituted judgment model pro-
vides some help in leading lawyer to a more child-centered represention).
268 See Lyon, supra note 180, at 701; Mandelbaum, supra note 267, at 65-67.
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ble children or other similarly situated persons have done or would do
in like circumstances. 269 Even when a young child is involved, the
child is always seen as the best source of information about his own
values and preferences.2 70 When information from the child is ex-
hausted, the advocate may seek additional insight from adults who
know the child well. 27 ' The attorney who honestly seeks to determine
what the client would want if he were competent, may better satisfy
the client's desires than would the best-interest advocate who simply
advocates what he or she believes to be best.
Although the doctrine is most commonly applied in the contem-
plation of medical treatment and in the legal representation of the
elderly,2 72 at least one commentator has argued for its application in
the delinquency context, at least on behalf of those children who are
clearly incompetent.273 Robyn-Marie Lyon makes an interesting argu-
ment for use of the doctrine of substituted judgment in place of a
best-interest model.2 74 As a preliminary matter, Lyon supports the
idea that in most juvenile proceedings, the attorney should, to the
extent possible, act as the child's voice, presenting the court with the
child's own expressed-interests or desires. 275 However, recognizing
that the child's age, maturity, and mental health status may sometimes
prevent the child from clearly communicating his or her desires to the
attorney,276 Lyon concludes that the child's attorney may apply the
doctrine of substituted judgment and approximate the decision the
child would make if he were mature. 277 In juvenile proceedings, the
attorney would consider evidence of what the immature child desires
now; opinions of informed individuals concerning what the child
would desire if competent; and evidence of what similarly situated ma-
ture people wish had been advocated on their behalf.2 78
2. Limitations of Doctrine
Despite its benefits, the doctrine of substituted judgment will
have limited value in the delinquency context. Historically, the doc-
269 Lurie, supra note 267, at 235-36; Mandelbaum, supra note 267, at 65-67 (ex-
plaining application of substituted judgment by courts).
270 Lyon, supra note 180, at 703; Mandelbaum, supra note 267, at 66.
271 Mandelbaum, supra note 267, at 66.
272 Id. n.258.
273 Lyon, supra note 180, at 702.
274 Id. at 701.
275 Id. at 692.
276 Id. at 692-93.
277 Id. at 693.
278 Id. at 703.
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trine was developed as a framework for the representation of clients
who were once competent, but due to advanced age or illness, have
become incompetent.279 In cases where the client was previously com-
petent, the attorney will generally have access to a record of the cli-
ent's values and preferences and be in a better position to make the
same decision the client would make if he were competent. Some
commentators have explicitly rejected the use of the substituted judg-
ment doctrine for minors and other individuals who have never been
legally competent. 280 In the medical context, commentators argue
that where an individual has never developed a personal value system,
either because of youth or infirmity, application of the substituted
judgment doctrine would undermine the client's right to self-determi-
nation because the decisionmaker will ultimately substitute his or her
own values for those of the incompetent.281 When the doctrine is ap-
plied on behalf of young children, it often deteriorates into a "reason-
able child" test that does not adequately consider the individual and
unique interests and desires of the child.282
Even when the child is older and there is a history of the client's
values and preferences, the substituted judgment doctrine still in-
volves a degree of speculation on the part of counsel since the client is
not directly expressing his or her desires. 2 13 Because the doctrine
gives the attorney considerable discretion to obtain and interpret in-
formation about the child's preferences, the doctrine is subject to ar-
bitrariness and abuse.284 The attorney who disagrees with the child's
stated preferences may even hide behind substituted judgment as a
mask for what he believes to be in the child's best-interest. In these
279 Cara Cheyette, Organ Harvests from the Legally Incompetent: An Argument Against
Compelled Altruism, 41 B.C. L. REv. 465, 486 (2000) (noting that the doctrine first
emerged in the property context).
280 Norman L. Cantor, The Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly
Mentally Disabled Person, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 42-43 (2004); Cheyette, supra note
279, at 492.
281 Cheyette, supra note 279, at 492; Guggenheim, supra note 83, at 1400 ("The
crucial difference between most impaired adults, such as the elderly, and young chil-
dren, is that those adults have lived a full life, during which their personalities, values,
and preferences became knowable. Young children, in contrast, have not yet reached
the point in life when their values have been revealed.").
282 Michael D. Grabo & Michael Sapoznikow, The Ethical Dilemma of Involuntary
Medication in Death Penalty Cases, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 805-06 (2002); Mandel-
baum, supra note 267, at 67.
283 Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical
Decision Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 444 (2002).
284 Cantor, supra note 280, at 43; Lurie, supra note 267, at 235.
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cases, the doctrine becomes illusory and becomes virtually indistin-
guishable from the best-interest model.2 5
Although the doctrine's articulated commitment to child-cen-
tered advocacy is preferable to the goals of traditional or parent-di-
rected advocacy, the doctrine of substituted judgment is of limited
value because it is difficult to apply on behalf of youth and remains
vulnerable to the same abuses evident in best-interest advocacy. If the
doctrine is to be applied in the delinquency context, it is only appro-
priate in those circumstances where the client's cognitive capacity is so
diminished that the client cannot communicate with counsel or make
adequately considered decisions on his own behalf.28 6 And in those
cases, it is not at all clear that the child would be competent to stand
trial for alleged criminal or delinquent conduct. 28 7 Nonetheless, the
doctrine may provide an appropriate alternative paradigm in some
cases for older youth who are competent to stand trial, but have con-
siderable difficulty in communicating their goals and desires to
counsel.
III. CONTINUUM OF TRADITIONAL, EXPRESSED-INTEREST ADVOCACY
Within the debate on the role of child's counsel, opponents of
the best-interest and substituted-judgment models champion what is
often referred to as a "traditional" or "zealous" model of representa-
tion. The "traditional" and "zealous" nomenclature has been adopted
by those who seek to require the same level of "zealous" advocacy on
behalf of children as has been traditionally expected for adults in
criminal cases.288
Unfortunately, reliance on terminology lifted from the adult
criminal context may generate more confusion and opposition than
necessary. The concept of "zealous advocacy" is detrimentally impre-
cise in the childlaw context because it focuses the inquiry on the zeal
with which an attorney argues a particular position and ignores the
core of the debate regarding the allocation of decisionmaking author-
285 Grabo & Sapoznikow, supra note 282, at 806 (suggesting that the best-interest
and substituted judgment models often converge in practice).
286 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 7 (2003) (permitting protective
action in only these limited circumstances).
287 For a discussion of juvenile competency to stand trial, see supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
288 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 205, at 335 (contrasting the best-interests model
with "traditional" client-directed advocacy); Michelle Markowitz, Note, Is a Lauyer Who
Represents the "Best-Interests" Really the Best for Pennsylvania's Children?, 64 U. PIrr. L. REV.
615, 618-20 (2003) (noting the difference between a "traditional advocate" and a
guardian ad litem, who would represent the child's best-interests).
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ity between the client and the lawyer. An attorney may "zealously"
advocate what he believes to be in the best-interest of the child as
"zealously" as he may advocate the articulated interests of the child.
The term "zealous advocate" may also carry a negative connotation
that opponents of the best-interest models do not intend to convey.
Specifically, the term has often been used to imply that defense coun-
sel should work single-mindedly-both within and outside the bounds
of the law-to "get the client off."289 Advocates who oppose this ap-
proach in criminal defense will categorically reject its application to
the representation of children in delinquency cases. Thus, the "zeal-
ous" label may simply overstate the alternative to best-interest advo-
cacy. Granting a child authority to make decisions regarding the
direction of his case does not permit the attorney to act outside the
law any more than the allocation of decisionmaking authority to an
adult client.290
The label "traditional advocate" is no more precise than the label
"zealous." Because there is no consensus on what an appropriate
"traditional" attorney-client relationship should look like among
adults, the term does not provide the child advocate with any mean-
ingful guidance on how he or she should interact with a minor. At
one extreme, the "traditional" lawyer representing an adult client will
blindly follow the every direction of the client.29 1 At the opposite ex-
treme, the lawyer will follow the client's direction in name only, but
will otherwise control the outcome of decisions by manipulating or
withholding information from the client or by coercing the client to
decide one way or the other.292 In adult criminal cases, conventional
wisdom suggests that the "traditional" attorney-client relationship is
actually more attorney-driven than client-driven. 293 Viewed in this
way, neither the "zealous model" nor the "traditional model" depicts a
desirable alternative to best-interest advocacy.
Although I prefer the term "expressed-interest" advocacy in this
Article, I do recognize that it too has its own limitations. While the
289 See Kay & Segal, supra note 12, at 1401, 1416; Marrus, supra note 8, at 326-27.
290 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) and cmts. 9-13.
291 See generally THOMAS L. SHAFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 15-29 (1994) (analyzing the experiences of one lawyer for
the poor in the context of client control and client autonomy).
292 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-2(b), at 111.
293 Attorneys often fail to consult with their clients, bully them into various deci-
sions throughout the case, and/or force them to take pleas that are good for the
system. Id. § 2-2, at 12, 14 (criticizing the traditional model as authoritarian and at-
torney-directed); see RodneyJ. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness:
Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 763, 766-67 (2000).
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term probably most precisely captures the debate over the rights of
competent children to direct their lawyer in the course of representa-
tion, the "expressed-interest" language still leaves room for variation
in the degrees to which the attorney may control and manipulate the
client. As a result, a fairly wide continuum of legal counseling models
has emerged in the guise of "expressed-interest" advocacy. This Part
looks to literature on client counseling theory for direction on how a
"traditional" or "expressed-interest" model might be adopted in the
representation of children in delinquency cases. For ease of discus-
sion, this Part will consider only three basic variations of "traditional"
client counseling: (1) the authoritarian (coercive, attorney-driven)
model, (2) the client-centered model and (3) the collaborative
model. 29 4 While each of these models technically allows the client to
determine the "objectives" of the representation, 295 each model dif-
fers in how passively or coercively the attorney will guide the client's
decisions. Counseling models that fall on the coercive end of the con-
tinuum differ very little from the best-interest models discussed in Part
II and prove unsatisfactory for the representation of an accused juve-
nile. Counseling models in which the attorney remains neutral or
highly deferential to the client may prove equally unsatisfactory as
they would deprive the child of much-needed guidance and insight
from a legal advisor. Ultimately, this author rejects the extreme varia-
tions of traditional expressed-interest advocacy and opts for a more
collaborative relationship between the attorney and the child. Not
only will the child find greater satisfaction in collaboration with his
lawyer, but best-interest and expressed-interest advocates may find a
place of compromise in a collaborative paradigm.
Successful attorney-client collaboration will not only preserve cli-
ent autonomy and due process, but will also enhance the child's deci-
sionmaking capacity and improve the child's judgment.296 By
increasing the child's fund of information and guiding the child
through calculated reasoning, the lawyer who collaborates with his cli-
ent may alleviate the concerns of those best-interest advocates who are
reluctant to defer to the judgment of a minor. Likewise, by maximiz-
294 SeeCOCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-1, at 2;Joseph Allegretti, The Role of a
Lauyer's Morals and Religion When Counseling Clients in Bioethics, 30 FoRDHAM UR. L.J.
9, 12-18 (2002); Robert F. CochranJr., Review Essay: The Rule of Law(yers): The Practice
of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers'Ethics, 65 Mo. L. REv. 571, 588-96 (2000).
295 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (requiring the lawyer to "abide
by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation" and to consult
with the client as to the means by which those objectives will be met).
296 The Model Rules support efforts to maximize the client's capacities. See-id. R.
1.14 cmt. 5.
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ing the child's participation in the relationship and giving true alle-
giance to the child's decisions after extensive and reasoned
consultation, the collaborative lawyer may improve the child's pros-
pects for successful rehabilitation.
A. Authoritarian Models
Of the three primary variations in traditional, expressed-interest
advocacy, the authoritarian model is the most coercive and least defer-
ential to clients. Although the authoritarian lawyer technically allows
the client to determine the objectives of the representation, the lawyer
assumes a very paternalistic, directive and sometimes coercive role in
the attorney-client dyad.297 Like the best-interest advocate, the au-
thoritarian lawyer assumes that his client lacks the competence and
wisdom to make the best choice in the case. Because he views the
legal issue as a technical problem, the attorney also assumes that he
will have the technical or legal expertise to make decisions on the
client's behalf.298 The lawyer then expects that his client will follow
passively, either by choice or default.299
Coercion in the authoritarian model is not always intentional or
aggressive. In some instances, the lawyer may not even be conscious
of the influence or pressure he exerts over the client. Instead, the
attorney may subtly usurp direction and authority in the relationship
by manipulating information or controlling the content and sequence
of meetings with the client.3 00 Attorneys control content by interrupt-
ing the client, limiting topics of conversation, withholding informa-
tion, or narrowing the alternatives from which the client may
choose.30' Attorneys may also influence client decisions by speaking in
legalese, framing issues in a narrow and limiting fashion, or strategi-
cally arranging the list of options to exaggerate or emphasize negative
297 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-2(b), at 111.
298 Id. § 1-2, at 2; see Cochran, supra note 294, at 589; RodneyJ. Uphoff, Relations
Between Lawyer and Client in Damages: Model, Typical, or Dysfunctional?, 2004 J. Disp.
RESOL. 145, 152.
299 See Allegretti, supra note 294, at 12 ("Clients are expected to be docile and
passive. They should trust their lawyers to act in their best-interests. They should not
ask too many questions or take too active a role on their own behalf."); see also
COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-2(b), at 111; Uphoff, supra note 298, at 152.
300 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 2-1, at 11, § 2-3, at 14-16.
301 Id. § 8-3(a) (2), at 137; Lynn Mather, Fundamentals: What Do Clients Want? What
Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1070 (2003) (discussing the malleability of legal
language).
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or positive outcomes.30 2 Lawyers may also manipulate the client's
trust through harsh critique of others in the legal system. 3°3
The opportunity for coercion is particularly great when the client
is a child. Differences in age and expertise combined with the child's
natural inclination to defer to adults create inherent power dynamics
between the child and the attorney. An attorney who seeks to turn his
client into a good and responsible citizen may coerce the child to
plead guilty to begin the rehabilitative process or otherwise coerce the
child to pursue what the lawyer believes to be in the best-interest of
the child or even in the best-interest of the child's family. The juve-
nile attorney who is concerned about the child's need for psychiatric
or psychological treatment may manipulate the options available to
the child in order to earn the child's consent to a residential treat-
ment program despite the child's desire to remain at home.
The authoritarian lawyer may defend his paternalistic interven-
tion through a broad reading of the ends/means allocation in Rule
1.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Although the rule
grants the client authority over the ultimate ends or objectives of the
case, the rule also grants the attorney authority over the means by
which those ends will be achieved. Because the ends/means distinc-
tion is a hollow and ambiguous one at best,30 4 there is considerable
room for the attorney to manipulate the line between strategy and
objectives. The Supreme Court's fairly broad interpretation of effec-
tive assistance of counsel also gives the lawyer considerable control
over the day-to-day tactics and strategies that must be resolved during
the course of representation.3 0 5
302 COCHRAN ETAL., supra note 121, § 8-3(a)(2), at 137; Mather, supra note 301, at
1070.
303 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 2-4, at 18 (noting that when judges and
opposing lawyers are portrayed as incompetent, clients are left with little alternative
but to trust their own lawyer as an insider).
304 Robert P. Burns & Steven Lubet, Division of Authority Between Attorney and Client:
The Case of the Benevolent Otolaryngologist, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1294-96 (discuss-
ing the problems that arise because of the lack of a well defined boundary between
ends and means).
305 See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon,. 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004) (finding no presumptive inef-
fective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to obtain defendant's express ap-
proval of trial strategy that conceded guilt to capital murder and focused on plea for
leniency in penalty phase); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (holding that attorney's
failure to present mitigating evidence and waiver of final argument were tactical deci-
sions about which competent lawyers might disagree and thus not ineffective assis-
tance of counsel); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (finding no ineffective
assistance of counsel where defense counsel blatantly violated discovery rules to gain a
tactical advantage).
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1. Limitations of the Authoritarian Model
Viewing the attorney-client relationship through the authorita-
rian lens exposes the dangers of adopting a nominal or perfunctory
commitment to some traditional, expressed-interest model of advo-
cacy. Models that fall in the coercive range of client counseling differ
from the best-interest model in name only. In the authoritarian
model, the theoretical commitment to client autonomy and client di-
rection is overwhelmed by the practice of manipulation and coercion.
Ultimately, the authoritarian model raises all of the same concerns as
best-interest advocacy including client dissatisfaction, the loss of criti-
cal insight and information from the client, and the compromise of
due process.
Like best-interest advocacy, authoritarian counseling often pro-
duces a poor or unsatisfactory legal outcome by inhibiting a full ex-
change of information between the lawyer and the client.,0 6 The
attorney who controls the client interview and limits free input from
the client will misconstrue the client's goals and miss significant facts
and circumstances surrounding the legal issues. The client who is sti-
fled by the control of the authoritarian lawyer will often be dissatisfied
with the legal process and unwilling to follow through with court or-
ders and recommendations made by a judge who has never heard or
considered his views. 30 7 When representing a child in the juvenile jus-
tice system, the authoritarian lawyer may impede rehabilitation by sti-
fling the child's commitment to and cooperation with the disposition
plan.
Since only the most knowledgeable, self-confident child is likely
to overcome the coercive influence of the manipulative and learned
counsel, the authoritarian approach will effectively deny most chil-
dren the right to meaningfully assert or waive substantive rights such
as the right to confront witnesses or avoid self-incrimination.3""' Like
the best-interest model, the authoritarian model proves unsatisfactory
as it merely substitutes one limit on the client's autonomy (the attor-
ney) for another (the state).309
306 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-2, at 3; Allegretti, supra note 294, at 13-14;
Cochran, supra note 294, at 582-83.
307 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-3(a), at 115; Allegretti, supra note 294, at
13 (noting that the authoritarian model produces less satisfaction for clients).
308 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-2, at 3.
309 See id.
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B. Client-Centered Counseling
Many critics of the authoritarian, lawyer-dominated models have
endorsed a client-centered alternative that recognizes individual au-
tonomy and self-determination as a "cornerstone" of the American po-
litical system. 310  In stark contrast to the best-interest and
authoritarian models, client-centered advocacy is nondirective, rejects
lawyer paternalism and manipulation,31 and operates with a strong
respect for the autonomy and dignity of clients.3 12 In early articula-
tions of the model, client-centered advocates resisted giving the client
any opinion as to what action the client should take.313 Even in more
recent and less extreme articulations of the model, the client-centered
lawyer plays a limited role in client decisionmaking, limits the advice
he offers and communicates neutrality to the greatest extent possi-
ble. 314 When the client actively seeks advice from the lawyer, the law-
yer may provide information about several possible courses of action,
but will urge the client to make decisions for himself and be careful
not to tell clients what to do.315 The lawyer may even introduce non-
legal and moral issues for the client's consideration so long as he does
not seek to impose his own values. 316
310 Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32
ARIz. L. REV. 501, 510-13 (1990); see also Cochran, supra note 294, at 590-91; Mather,
supra note 301, at 1068.
311 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 555; Jason J. Kilborn, Who's in Charge Here? Put-
ting Clients in Their Place, 37 GA. L. REv. 1, 34 (2002).
312 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-3, at 5, § 7-2(a), at 111; Cochran, supra
note 294, at 590-91.
313 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 509; see Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client
Competence and Theories of Practice, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 121, 121 (1999). When David A.
Binder and Susan C. Price published Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered
Approach in 1977, their "client-centered" approach quickly became the standard for
interviewing and counseling. At the heart of Binder and Price's "client-centered" ap-
proach is the idea that a lawyer should refrain from influencing his client's decisions,
and should instead facilitate client decisionmaking by providing the client with the
full list of options, along with all consequences for each option. See John M.A.
DiPippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L.
REv. 81, 106 (2001).
314 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-3, at 5; Dinerstein, supra note 310, at
587.
315 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-3, at 6, § 7-2(a), at 111; Dinerstein, supra
note 310, at 508-09 (noting that attorneys develop a list of options, ask the client for
additional options, discuss the positive and negative consequences of each option,
offer predictions about the likelihood of each option and assist the client in weighing
the consequences of each option).
316 Cochran, supra note 294, at 591; Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 563-65;
Kilborn, supra note 311, at 45.
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Proponents of client-centered advocacy believe that lawyers are
rarely in the best position to determine which alternatives will provide
the greatest satisfaction for the client.3 17 Client-centered advocates
also believe that a client is more likely to accept and comply with a
decision he has made himself.318 Even when a judge will be the ulti-
mate decisionmaker, such as in a delinquency case, clients may be
more likely to follow through with court-imposed obligations when
they are allowed greater participation in the decisionmaking pro-
cess.3 19 Likewise, client participation in the attorney-client relation-
ship appears to reduce the anxiety that often accompanies the client's
passive or blind role in the legal process. 320 Client-centered lawyering
also protects the client's substantive and due process rights by giving
the client clear and unfettered authority to exercise or waive those
rights.
1. Limitations of Client-Centered Model
On its face, the client-centered model may appeal to opponents
of best-interest advocacy because it protects the client's substantive
rights, encourages client buy-in, and satisfies ethical obligations that
allocate decisionmaking authority to the client. However, the client-
centered model has also been the subject of considerable criticism.
Commentators, for example, often complain that the client-centered
model actually denies client autonomy by encouraging the lawyer to
withhold advice. 32' When the client asks the lawyer to make decisions
for him, a rigid adherence to client-centeredness is clearly inconsis-
tent with the client's desires and expectations. 3 22 Critics of the client-
centered model argue that clients rarely come to the attorney-client
relationship with a preconceived set of goals and interests, but instead
shape and construct those goals through interaction with the law-
317 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 509, 516; Kilborn, supra note 311, at 36.
318 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 547-48; Kilborn, supra note 311, at 36.
319 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 549 (studies show that "clients value the per-
ceived fairness of the process through which their claims are adjudicated as well as the
outcomes they receive"); see also Berkheiser, supra note 68, at 643 (noting that studies
have shown that youthful offenders are more likely to respond positively to court in-
tervention when they are active participants than when the process is imposed upon
them).
320 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 548-49; Ronner, supra note 177, at 94.
321 See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 567; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Cli-
ents, 34 UCLA L. RiV. 717, 745-46 (1987).
322 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-4, at 7; Dinerstein, supra note 310, at
574-75; see also DiPippa, supra note 313, at 108 (arguing that clients expect lawyers to
provide substantive and procedureal advice and that a pure client-centered approach
cannot be maintained).
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yer.32 3 These critics also see balanced persuasion as a necessary and
acceptable part of any autonomous relationship 324 and worry that ex-
cessive deference to clients will deprive the client of important legal
insight and produce unnecessarily poor decisions. 325
Some critics also complain that client-centered advocacy encour-
ages and facilitates self-centered decisionmaking by the client. 326 The
client may even interpret the lawyer's neutrality in the face of the cli-
ent's morally dubious action as an affirmation of the client's choice.327
In a delinquency case or other family-related proceeding, a child may
fail to consider the impact of his conduct and choices on other family
members. By failing to account for the concerns and interests of a
parent, the child may lose critical parental support he will need in the
rehabilitative process.
The client-centered model, like many of the others, is also
grounded in a number of critical underlying assumptions that may
not hold true in the representation of children and adolescents. Most
significantly, the model assumes that there is a competent client who
has the capacity to make reasoned decisions based on articulated val-
ues that are not likely to change over time.32 8 While children are not
presumptively incompetent, cognitive and psychosocial limitations
may diminish decisionmaking capacity and render uncounseled defer-
ence to the child unsatisfactory. Because children reason with a rela-
tively small fund of general information and an even smaller fund of
legal information, children need lawyers to help them understand the
full range of options available to them in litigation. In a delinquency
case, for example, the child may be asked to decide whether he will
litigate pre-trial evidentiary issues; plead guilty or assert his right to
trial; assert his right to cross-examine government witnesses; and tes-
tify on his own behalf. Children have limited experience in these con-
texts and need and want the assistance and advice of a knowledgeable
adult and legal advisor. Ultimately, a client-centered model that en-
323 See Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 574-75.
324 Id. at 517 n.75 (drawing analogy from the medical model of informed
consent).
325 Id. at 505; Ellmann, supra note 321, at 745.
326 Cochran, supra note 294, at 592.
327 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9-3, at 175.
328 See id. § 7-2(a), at 111 (explaining that the model assumes that most clients are
capable of thinking through the complexities of their problems); Dinerstein, supra
note 310, at 510 n.38 (stating that even the original drafters of the client-centered
model recognized that the model may not be appropriate for the client who is clearly
incapable of making decisions); Federle, supra note 61, at 1676.
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courages the lawyer to withhold advice may not be flexible enough to
accommodate the needs of the juvenile defendant.
C. Collaborative Model
Critics of the client-centered model have proposed a number of
modifications to the client-centered framework and in some instances
have introduced new client counseling theories. 329 While critics con-
tinue to favor client loyalty and autonomy, they seek to increase attor-
ney input and encourage greater collaboration between the attorney
and the client.330 In the collaborative counseling models, the client
controls the decisions, but the lawyer offers advice and structures the
counseling process in a way that is likely to foster good decisionmak-
ing by the client.3 's Collaborative lawyers provide relevant informa-
tion about available options, help clients clarify personal goals and
objectives, and give clients emotional and social support for their deci-
sions s.1 2 The lawyer is essentially "nondirective" as to the client's ulti-
mate decision, but "directive" as to the process to be followed in
reaching that decision.3 3 .
In many ways, the collaborative model of legal representation
parallels the development of the informed consent doctrine in the
medical field.3 34 When there is informed consent in the medical con-
text, the patient willingly accepts medical intervention after adequate
disclosure by the physician of the risks and benefits associated with the
proposed intervention and all of its possible alternatives. 3- 5 The doc-
trine emphasizes the connection between informed consent and pa-
tient autonomy and focuses on shared decisionmaking between the
physician and the patient.- 36
329 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 587 (proposing revision of the model to allow
the lawyer to offer his advice).
330 DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH (2d ed. 2004); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old
Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 93 (2000).
331 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-4, at6, § 7-1, at 110; see Robert F. Cochran,
Jr. et al., Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 598 (2003)
("The client makes the ultimate decision, but the lawyer is actively involved in the
process.").
332 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-2(d), at 113.
333 Id. § 8-1, at 131; Allegretti, supra note 294, at 16 (quoting COCHRAN ET AL.,
supra note 121, § 1-4, at 6).
334 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 525.
335 Id. at 530 & n.132; see Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy
Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 364-65 (2002) (de-
fining informed consent doctrine).
336 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 530; Noah, supra note 335, at 364-65.
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In the collaborative legal paradigm, advocates recognize that cli-
ents seek the assistance of lawyers precisely because they want the law-
yer's advice, guidance, and wisdom. 337  Thus, the lawyer's
responsibility is notjust to passively or neutrally list alternatives, but to
ensure that the client will consider and evaluate all of the available
options and choose the best alternative. 338 To achieve these goals, the
lawyer may appropriately advise and persuade the client in counsel-
ing.339 Moreover, because the effective counselor wants to help his
client avoid mistakes, the attorney may tell the client that he is choos-
ing a patently bad alternative and explain why.340 Although the col-
laborative lawyer must take sides with his client, he will also remain
objective in offering a realistic appraisal of all of the legal and nonle-
gal advantages and disadvantages of a contemplated course of ac-
tion.341 By facilitating a meaningful attorney-client dialogue in which
all of the available options and likely consequences are identified, col-
laboration may even empower politically disadvantaged clients such as
the young and the poor who are often unsophisticated and lack
knowledge about legal matters.342
Finally, proponents of the collaborative model caution against
the binary terminology of lawyer domination versus client domina-
tion.3 43 Because the model values flexibility and variability in the at-
torney-client relationship, the collaborative model also allows the
parties to negotiate the terms of the relationship and allocate respon-
337 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-3(a), at 114, § 8-1, at 131. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct also admonish lawyers to render "independent profes-
sional judgment" and "candid advice." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1
(2003).
338 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 8-1, at 131-32. The neutral investigative
model of advocacy has also been uniformly rejected by commentators and leaders in
the juvenile defense community. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 107-09; Mlyniec,
supra note 8, at 116.
339 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 517 (stating that some medical model informed
consent theorists assert "that persuasion is not only an acceptable but a necessary part
of an autonomous relationship").
340 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 8-1, at 132, § 8-4, at 141; Allegretti, supra
note 294, at 18-19 (noting that in the collaborative model, as between friends, the
lawyer should advise the client when the lawyer believes the client is making a bad
decision).
341 COCHRAN ET AL., suprd note 121, § 8-3(a), at 135; Allegretti, supra note 294, at
18-19.
342 See Cochran et al., supra note 331, at 592; Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 519;
Uphoff, supra note 298, at 157-58.
343 Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 524; see also Allegretti, supra note 294, at 17
("The lawyer is not the client's boss, but neither is she the client's hired gun.").
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sibility between them. 344 While some clients will need and desire the
lawyer's opinion and advice, others will not.
1. Collaborating with Children in the Juvenile Justice System
Of all the models examined in this article, the collaborative
model appears most likely to accommodate the needs of a child client.
Although the collaborative model-like the client-centered model-
presumes that the attorney will represent a competent client,3 45 the
collaborative model provides greater opportunity for the attorney to
maximize and enhance the child's limited cognitive capacities and im-
prove the child's judgment and insight.
Although research has shown that adolescents have certain cogni-
tive and psychosocial limitations that might frustrate the client's effec-
tive participation in the attorney-client relationship, there is no
magical age at which young people become capable of making good
decisions. 346 In fact, each of us cultivates decisionmaking skills over
time with growth, development, experience, and education.3 47 The
child will also develop his own code of personal morality and adopt
virtues such as courage, truthfulness, faithfulness, and mercy through
the trial and error of exercising moral judgment. - 48 Allowing the
child to collaborate with his attorney in a delinquency case gives the
child an opportunity to apply and enhance newly acquired decision-
making skills.
The collaborative model may offer a particularly useful frame-
work for the attorney-child dyad because the collaborative lawyer un-
derstands that good decisionmaking is predicated on the lawyer's
ability to create an appropriate environmental context for counseling
and to develop a good relationship with the client.3 49 For children
who demonstrate better cognitive capacity in contexts that are famil-
344 COCHRAN FT AL., supra note 121, § 2-7, at 25-29; Mather, supra note 301, at
1069.
345 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 2-7, at 27.
346 Even a child as young as five or six and certainly those of ten or twelve will
often have the ability "to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about
matters affecting [his] own well-being." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14
cmt. 1 (2003). Also by early adolescence the fundamental abilities of communication
are matured, further facilitating the attorney-client collaboration. Grisso, supra note
114, at 16.
347 Cf COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-4, at 8-9 (explaining that a lawyer
acquires good decisionmaking through "innate ability, habit, age, knowledge, breadth
of experience, education, and character" (citation omitted)).
348 See id. § 9-2(b), at 170.
349 Id. § 7-3, at 113; Uphoff, supra note 298, at 155-57.
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iar to them and devoid of stress,3 50 the collaborative counselor will
provide a comfortable physical and emotional environment and allo-
cate sufficient time for thorough counseling.351 The counselor will
also build rapport with the child over time, engage the child in a one-
on-one, age-appropriate dialogue, and repeat information as many
times as the child needs to hear it.352
Research also suggests that other psychosocial aspects of decision-
making-such as trust for adults, risk perception, and risk prefer-
ence-are likely to improve as the attorney-client relationship
improves.35 3 Because youth tend to have a higher level of trust and
satisfaction with attorneys who spend more time working with
them,3 54 the child is more likely to receive and accept input from the
collaborative lawyer. The child will also be able to avoid hasty, short-
sighted decisions when he has the assistance of a lawyer who will pa-
tiently help him identify and consider all of the long-term implica-
tions of any given decision.3 55 When provided with all of the relevant
information and given all of the appropriate environmental and emo-
tional supports, a child may make well reasoned decisions and appro-
priately direct his counsel in the course of the representation.
The collaborative model also appears flexible enough to accom-
modate the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and adapt
to differences between the disposition and adjudicatory phases of the
delinquency case. When the attorney opts not to rely solely on the
probation officer's assessment, but instead leads the child through an
independent investigation of his own needs and desires,356 the attor-
350 See Buss, supra note 56, at 918-19; Grisso, supra note 114, at 16-18. Studies
suggest that adolescents are more prone to offer inaccurate information to persons in
authority when they are pressured. Id. at 18. Even when adolescents' cognitive capac-
ities are similar to those of adults, theory suggests that they will deploy those abilities
with less dependability in new, ambiguous or stressful situations, because the abilities
have been acquired more recently and are less well established. Emotions, mood and
stress often have a negative influence on decisionmaking, causing a constriction in
the range of options considered or consequences foreseen.
351 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 8-5(a) (3), at 152-53.
352 See Dinerstein, supra note 310, at 556; Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Di-
lemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity To Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1873, 1898 (1996).
353 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 180.
354 Id.
355 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9-2(b), at 172.
356 As part of the independent investigation, the attorney may interview relatives,
gather school records, and in some cases arrange for an independent mental health
evaluation that will not automatically be shared with the court. The attorney might
secure payment for the evaluation through the child's Medicaid provider, family in-
surance, or the public school system. In deciding whether to arrange an independent
evaluation, the attorney will have to consult with the child to determine if the child is
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ney and his client will be in a better position to develop an appropri-
ate and reliable plan for rehabilitation. The collaborative lawyer
might even improve the child's rehabilitative prospects by working
with the child to investigate and identify creative, alternative solutions
to incarceration 35 7 and to increase the child's buy-in and compliance
with the ultimate disposition plan.3 55 8 The collaborative model ulti-
mately empowers the client to make a more thoughtful and well in-
formed choice among the options and gives real meaning to the
client's right to voice his opinion in the disposition hearing.
In some cases, the collaborative lawyer may also encourage the
client to consider those options which relevant adults perceive as
"best" for the child. Thus, in the delinquency context, the lawyer may
appropriately advise the child to consider (1) the long-term benefits
of treatment and rehabilitation, (2) the impact of his conduct and
choices on his family, and (3) the moral implications of his alleged
delinquent conduct on society. When the lawyer is not overbearing
and delays advice until he has an appropriate rapport with the client,
the child retains individual autonomy and is free to reject the lawyer's
opinion.3 59
Finally, the collaborative model may also accommodate the
unique interplay between lawyers, children, and their parents. Be-
cause the collaborative lawyer recognizes that effective decisionmakers
use all of the resources available to them, the lawyer may encourage
his client to talk to family members who may provide an alternative
perspective and additional information before making important de-
cisions. 360 Parental advice may be particularly helpful to a child who
willing to accept the further intrusion of an additional evaluation and will have to
evaluate the risk that requesting additional evaluations will reveal negative factors
about the client and result in a more restrictive disposition than the client wants.
357 See STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS 8.2 (IJA-ABA Joint Comm'n on
Juvenile Justice Standards 1979); STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PAR-
TIES 9.2(a)-(b) (IJA-ABAjoint Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Standards 1979) (proffer-
ing standards requiring attorneys to be familiar with all community services and
treatment alternatives available to the court and to investigate the source of any evi-
dence introduced at a disposition hearing).
358 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 8-1, at 131.
359 For more concrete strategies to avoid undue coercion by the lawyer represent-
ing children, see infra notes 364-66 and accompanying text.
360 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 8-5(b), at 155-56 (explaining that an attor-
ney might direct the client by asking "[i]s there anyone else that you would like to talk
to about this choice?"). Commentary to Model Rule 1.14 suggests that a client of
diminished capacity may invite a third party into the attorney-client discussion with-
out compromising the attorney-client privilege if the client needs the assistance of the
third party. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt 3 (2003).
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respects his parent's opinion and may help the child place decisions
in the context of important family values. Collaboration with parents
may also be useful to secure the parents' cooperation with the child's
ultimate decisions and to assist in any rehabilitative plan the court
orders. Unlike the exclusive parent-directed model and the poten-
tially selfish client-directed model, the collaborative model should fos-
ter cooperation among all of the significant people in the child's life.
Although the collaborative model falls by design within the ex-
pressed-interest continuum of attorney-client paradigms, the collabo-
rative model may also satisfy many of the normative concerns
expressed by best-interest advocates. Practitioners who resort to best-
interest advocacy because they believe that their clients are cognitively
unable to guide counsel may be willing to try a more collaborative
approach that is designed to enhance the cognitive ability of their cli-
ents and facilitate greater compliance by the child in the rehabilitative
process. Even those advocates who favor parental deference or hold
strong normative objections to children's autonomy may be willing to
try a model that allows, and at times even encourages, the child to
consult with his parents.
2. Limits of the Collaborative Model with Juveniles
Notwithstanding the practical utility of the framework, the collab-
orative model is not without its difficulties. Because the collaborative
model is both costly and time consuming, it will likely be resisted by
those lawyers who have high caseloads or work in resource-poor de-
fender offices. The model must also withstand the systemic pressures
ofjudges, probation officers, and other court officials who oppose any
model of advocacy that would hinder temporal and fiscal economy.
Yet, by increasing the child's participation and earning the child's co-
operation, the model should improve the overall success of rehabilita-
tion in juvenile court, increase public safety, and thereby justify the
added time and cost.
Status differences between the attorney and the child may create
additional difficulties for the collaborative lawyer. Because collabora-
tion is generally most successful when the deliberating parties are
equally dependent and of relatively equal status, 361 the lawyer who
represents the younger, less experienced child will always have the
challenge of achieving a delicate balance between legal advice and
client autonomy within the relationship. Not only will the lawyer have
greater expertise in the relevant area of law, but when the client is a
361 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1-4, at 7; see Cochran et al., supra note 331,
at 601.
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child, there will be additional disparities in age, life experience, and
knowledge. 362 In the criminal and delinquency contexts, the attorney-
client relationship is also likely to be further complicated by differ-
ences in race, class, education, and general status in society."'!
To achieve the delicate balance between advice and client auton-
omy, the lawyer must understand how developmental factors may af-
fect the attorney-client relationship and develop concrete methods to
improve interviewing, counseling, and decisionmaking with young cli-
ents.3 64 Effective client-centered and collaborative lawyers will engage
in active listening, pay attention to physical cues from the client, build
rapport, affirm the client, ask open-ended questions, and develop
questions to build from broad issues to narrow details. 365 The lawyer
might also vary the counseling dynamic throughout the course of the
relationship. In the early interviewing stages of the relationship, the
collaborative lawyer will be nonjudgmental and provide genuine, non-
contingent acceptance and empathy.3 66 After rapport is established in
later counseling sessions, the lawyer may more appropriately offer ad-
vice and raise concerns about the client's decisions. As the attorney
gets to know the child, the attorney will also be able to render advice
in the context of the child's life experience.
Nonlegal variables such as remorse and moral responsibility may
be more appropriately introduced in later stages of the case, such as
disposition, when the client is more likely to trust the lawyer's insight
and less likely to view the lawyer's advice as coercive. In earlier stages,
the introduction of nonlegal variables may appearjudgmental and im-
ply that social and moral issues are more important than the child's
substantive and procedural rights. For example, in a counseling ses-
sion in which the child must decide whether to accept the govern-
ment's plea offer, the client and the attorney will explore potential
defenses, evaluate the likely success of any defense, and consider the
risks associated with loss after trial. It may never be appropriate for
the lawyer to tell his client that he has a moral responsibility to plead
guilty because the child's parents are inconvenienced by having to
362 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9-5, at 185.
363 Id.
364 Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at 193.
365 There are a number of excellent resources on client interviewing skills, etc.
For a sample of general interview tips for adults and children, see COCHRAN ET AL.,
supra note 121, §§ 9-1 to -5, at 165-87. For a sampling of interviewing skill sets for
juveniles, see ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., TALKING TO TEENS IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR INTERVIEWING ADOLESCENT DEFENDANTS, WITNESSES, AND VIC-
TIMS (Lourdes M. Rosado ed., 2000).
366 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 121, § 7-3(a), at 114, § 9-3, at 175.
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come to court or because the lawyer believes the client owes an apol-
ogy or restitution to his victim. By contrast, it may be appropriate at
the time of the disposition, for the lawyer to encourage the child to
consider both the victims' interests and the benefits of treatment and
rehabilitation.
This is not to suggest that the attorney should never introduce
any nonlegal factors into the trial-related decision points. The child
may actually care how much time his or her parents will have to spend
in court. The attorney might even deal with issues of remorse in the
plea or trial discussion if the client has introduced the topic or if the
attorney legitimately believes that the judge will look favorably on the
child's plea in determining an appropriate disposition for the child.
By contrast, at the post-adjudication disposition phase issues of re-
morse and victim impact are inherently relevant and almost always
affect the judge's ultimate resolution of the case.
Although the collaborative model does present some challenges
for the child's lawyer, its benefits ultimately outweigh its difficulties.
With adequate training, patience, and a willingness to educate chil-
dren, in many cases the collaborative lawyer can enhance the child's
capacities and effectively follow the child's direction in the delin-
quency case. The benefits and flexibility of the collaborative model
also outweigh the benefits of best-interest advocacy and other surro-
gate decision models.
CONCLUSION
In the juvenile justice context, advocates must develop an attor-
ney-client paradigm that will give substantive meaning to the child's
constitutional right to counsel, satisfy fundamental due process and,
to the greatest extent possible, support the successful rehabilitation of
children in the juvenile justice system. The appropriate paradigm
must also comport with the Model Rules' preference for client loyalty
and autonomy, while simultaneously maximizing the child's mental,
emotional, and educational development. This Article rejects the
best-interest and parent-directed models as unsatisfactory on each of
these variables. Not only do these models patently deny individual
autonomy, but they also impede rehabilitation and undermine the
child's constitutional right to counsel.
Although we cannot expect the attorney-child relationship to be
an exact replica of the adult's attorney-client relationship, the pater-
nalistic advocacy that is so common in juvenile representation today
far exceeds that which is necessary to accommodate the child's inher-
ent limitations. Despite a clear consensus among leaders and aca-
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demic commentators in the juvenile justice community, professional
standards like those prepared by the IJA-ABA have not been effective
in bringing uniformity to the role of child's counsel in delinquency
cases. It may be that best-interest advocacy persists simply because
child advocates have polarized the issues in a way that is neither neces-
sary, nor useful. Best-interest advocates who continue to reject "tradi-
tional," "zealous" advocacy may well envision a rigid paradigm in
which the attorney works at all costs to get the client off or in which
the client dominates the lawyer's conduct without the lawyer's input
and advice. Zealous, expressed-interest advocates, on the other hand,
probably fear that any discussion of the child's best-interest will im-
pede client autonomy and invade fundamental rights. Framing the
debate in this way is no longer useful in the complex world ofjuvenile
court and the academy and professional leadership would do well to
abandon outdated terminology and explore a more collaborative ap-
proach to the attorney-child relationship.
A collaborative model of advocacy would support many juvenile
justice goals and offer a very practical default paradigm for the attor-
ney-child relationship. Not only does the model remain loyal to the
fundamental principles of client determination and informed auton-
omy, but the model is also flexible enough to accommodate the
unique aspects of juvenile court, including the special interplay of par-
ents, lawyers, and children and the court's commitment to rehabilita-
tion. The model also acknowledges the continuum of cognitive and
psychosocial limitations among youth without relying on overbroad,
bright-line presumptions that strip juveniles of their constitutional
right to counsel and gives the lawyer an opportunity to teach, guide,
and even persuade children without losing the child's trust or usurp-
ing the parent's role of moral instructor. Finally, the model also gives
parents a place in the child's decisionmaking process without transfer-
ring power to the parent, destroying the attorney-client nucleus, or
abandoning client loyalty and confidentiality.
Assuming that not all cognitive and psychosocial limitations can
be corrected or accommodated within the collaborative paradigm, the
practitioner will need an alternative framework for those limited occa-
sions when the child simply cannot communicate with his attorney or
engage in even the most basic analysis or reasoning. The practitioner
may (1) raise competency issues with the court and litigate the child's
competency to stand trial, (2) ask the court to appoint a guardian to
protect the client's interests while the advocate remains loyal to the
client's goals to the extent possible, or (3) attempt to determine what
the child would have done if he were competent and advocate pursu-
ant to the substituted judgment doctrine. For older youth who were
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at one time competent, the doctrine of substituted judgment may be
an appropriate option as it seeks to honor client autonomy and re-
quires the attorney to examine the child's pattern of preferences and
values in deciding what position to advocate on the child's behalf.
Unfortunately in those cases where the advocate has no basis upon
which to ascertain what the child would do if competent or where the
child is clearly incompetent to stand trial, substituted judgment is no
more appropriate than best-interest advocacy. In the latter cases, the
advocate should raise competency issues with the court and/or ask the
court to appoint a guardian.
